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ABSTRACT
The Pennsylvania constitution of 1776 ignited an extensive and intractable debate that
remained at the center of the state’s politics throughout the Revolutionary period. This
debate encompassed disagreement over a broad range of questions relating to the
relationship between government and society, many of which brought into question the
implications of the concept of popular sovereignty for governmental structure and
popular political agency. Competing notions regarding these issues, while expressed
within a general framework of consensus concerning the source of political authority [the
people], revealed fundamentally different visions of governmental order. Partisans
presented these visions as inextricably connected to their respective understandings of the
American Revolution. This debate suggests that constitutionalism and political ideology
were closely connected to, and mutually informative of, one another during the
Revolution and that factions within the Patriot cause perceived their differing visions of
government and brands of constitutionalism as inseparable from the cause of the
Revolution itself.
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Introduction: Pennsylvania and the Revolution as a Constitutional Phenomenon
“The time is now approaching, when the Colonies, will find themselves under a
Necessity, of engaging in Earnest in this great and indispensable Work [the
creation of new governments]. I have ever Thought it the most difficult and
dangerous Part of the Business, Americans have to do, in this mighty Contest, to
contrive some Method for the Colonies to glide insensibly, from the old
Government, into a peaceable and contented Submission to new ones…At
present, this sense of Necessity seems to be general, and Measures are taking
which must terminate in a compleat Revolution. There is a Danger of
Convulsions. But I hope, not great ones.”—John Adams, April 17761
The American Revolution’s essential character and central concerns have been the
objects of extensive scholarly debate. Historians have disagreed at length as to whether
the Revolution was a contest, as Carl Becker famously put it, over “home rule or who
should rule at home” but less attention has been given to debates within America over
what home rule should ultimately look like.2 Further contention exists over whether the
Revolution was fundamentally a political, social, or economic phenomenon and whether
it decisively reshaped society within the newly formed American states.3 Perhaps the

1

John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, April 16, 1776 in ed. Robert Taylor, The Adams Papers, Papers of
John Adams, vol. 4, February-August 1776 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 123-126. Accessed at
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-04-02-0044.
2
Carl L. Becker, The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776 (1909; reprint,
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 22.
3
For examples of the constitutionally-attuned interpretation of the Revolution’s origins and character, see
Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Foundations of American Constitutionalism (New York: New York
University Press, 1932); John Phillip Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution, 4 vols.
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986-1993); Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution:
Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain (New York: Knopf, 1972); Jack
P. Greene, Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British
Empire and the United States, 1607-1789 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986); Negotiated
Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History (Charlottesville: University of Virginia
Press, 1994) and The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge University Press,
2011).
For accounts that privilege examination of economic and social affairs over the assessment of constitutional
and political development, see Jackson Turner Main, The Social Structure of Revolutionary America
(Princeton University Press, 1965) and The Sovereign States, 1775-1783 (New York: Franklin Watts,
1973); Merrill Jensen, The American People and the American Revolution (Menasha, WI: George Banta,
1970); The American Revolution within America (New York University Press, 1974); Gary Nash, The
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only thing regarding which scholars can come to a consensus is that colonists in British
North America engaged in an effort to separate themselves from the British empire and
reshape their colonies into independent and sovereign states.
The case of the state constitutions shows the importance of ideology in
Revolutionary America. While the movement to secure independence from Britain
prompted domestic debate over social and economic affairs, discussion of constitutional
and political matters predominated. The cause of drafting new constitutions commanded
the attention of politically active individuals within each of the colonies. Although
independence was formally declared by the Continental Congress in July of 1776, the
Declaration written by Thomas Jefferson merely provided rhetorical flourish and
intellectual justification to a process of separation that was already in some places being
decisively finalized through the creation of state constitutions.4 The drafting and adoption
of new constitutions signaled the colonies’ transformation into separate and distinct
political societies whose ties to the British empire had been decisively severed.
The process of creating state constitutions prompted a broad range of debates over
proper political structure and the relationship between the government and the governed.
Nowhere was controversy over these issues as intense and influential as in Pennsylvania,
where the state constitution eschewed prevailing notions about the balancing of power
between the branches (executive, legislative, and judicial) of government, bicameralism,
and the importance of a deferential element of politics. The authors of the Pennsylvania

Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).
4
On the mostly symbolic function of the Declaration, see Pauline Maier, American Scripture: Making the
Declaration of Independence (New York: Knopf, 1997).
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constitution seized upon the implications embedded within the logic of popular
sovereignty that had animated Whig grievances against British policy and instituted them
within the structure of their new government.
Because the Pennsylvania constitution was such a decisive rejection of
conventional assumptions about government, it sparked enormous debate. The
constitution was the central issue of political contention in Pennsylvania from its
inception in 1776 through its replacement in 1790. It was the defining concern of the
state’s discourse during the Revolutionary period. The parameters of state politics
adhered closely to the lines of disagreement over the constitution which emerged shortly
following its publication for public consideration.
In the process of debating the constitution, its supporters, the Constitutionalists,
and opponents, the Republicans, advanced distinct and competing visions of
governmental structure. These visions implicated conflicting understandings of the
implications of popular sovereignty, the notion that all political authority was ultimately
derived from the people. Constitutionalists and Republicans alike affirmed the doctrine of
popular sovereignty, but they expressed altogether differing understandings of its
implications. The Constitutionalists believed that, because the people reigned supreme,
the legislature should be the preeminent branch of government so that the people’s
interests predominated in governmental matters. This was a rejection of conventional
assumptions about the need for a balance of power. Republicans agreed that the people
were sovereign but thought that power needed to be diffused so that the influence of the
electorate could be checked by various elements of government. Each branch of
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government was representative, but Republicans believed that distinctions between them
were essential to maintaining governmental stability.
Constitutionalists and Republicans associated their separate visions of political
order with the American Revolution. Constitutionalists believed that, because the
Revolution was an effort to secure popular control of government, it was imperative to
create a constitution which clearly and directly established that principle as the reigning
logic of government. Republicans argued that the constitution was such an affront to
assumptions about government they regarded as universal and indispensable that it
jeopardized the prospect of securing Pennsylvania’s independence. They further
contended that the constitution’s failure to impose constraints on legislative power made
the state Assembly an omnipotent and arbitrary institution—similar, they noted, to a
Parliament which failed to recognize the boundaries inherent to the English Constitution.
Thus, they argued, the constitution was a fundamental threat to the Revolutionary cause.
The Pennsylvania constitutional debate was both a contest between competing
visions of political order and a referendum on the character and fate of the American
Revolution. Historians have devoted considerable attention to the divisions that separated
the constitution’s partisans and critics. They have stressed the radicalism of the authors
and champions of the constitution and emphasized the conservative and reactionary
tendencies of the constitution’s opponents, in the process telling a story of internal
division predicated on conflicting constitutional visions.5 However, they have primarily

5

J. Paul Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776: A Study in Revolutionary Democracy
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936); Robert L. Brunhouse, The Counterrevolution in
Pennsylvania, 1776-1790 (Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1942); Jackson Turner
Main, Political Parties before the Constitution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973),
175-211; Richard A. Ryerson, “Republican Theory and Partisan Reality in Revolutionary Pennsylvania:

ix

examined the practical dimensions of the constitutional controversy, examining the
actions of the state Assembly, assessing the composition of the Constitutionalist and
Republican parties, and emphasizing the importance of economic and logistical concerns
to political debates. These issues were important to state politics. However, they were not
quite as central as the differences in constitutional ideology that separated
Constitutionalists and Republicans and seemed to ensure that political reconciliation
would be an impossible venture so long as the constitution remained intact.
This study intends to redress this historiographical oversight by both asserting the
primacy of ideological division in shaping state politics and assessing disagreement about
the nature of the Revolution in Pennsylvania. Through a series of case studies, I
demonstrate that the essential differences in the Constitutionalists’ and Republicans’
visions of political order provided the basis for their numerous disagreements on the
constitution. Because Republicans insisted that the constitutions’ perceived problems
could only be redressed by either substantively reshaping the constitution or abandoning
it altogether and Constitutionalists remained steadfast in their insistence that the
constitution’s maintenance was essential to securing the Revolution, Pennsylvania
politics was fraught with interminable disagreement regarding the legitimacy and
sustainability of the state’s source of fundamental law.
This study has implications which extend beyond the study of Pennsylvania and
relate generally to the study of the American Revolution. Consideration of constitutional

Toward a New View of the Constitutionalist Party,” in eds., Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, Sovereign
States in an Age of Uncertainty (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1981); Owen S. Ireland, “The
Crux of Politics: Religion and Party in Pennsylvania, 1778-1789,” William and Mary Quarterly 42, no. 4
(October, 1985), 453-475; Douglas Arnold, A Republican Revolution: Ideology and Politics in
Pennsylvania, 1776-1790 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989).
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and political issues as sources of domestic disagreement has been largely abandoned in
recent decades in favor of Neo-Progressive examinations of economic and social
animosity and culturally minded assessments of the place of race and gender in the
Revolution.6 While these approaches have produced useful insights into the
Revolutionary era, they have failed to provide a comprehensive explanation for the
differences in domestic outlook that characterized various elements of the movement for
American independence. The Pennsylvania constitutional dispute demonstrates that
differences in political and constitutional ideology were central to the divisions regarding
the nature and purpose of the Revolution that emerged within the Patriot camp. Even in
Pennsylvania, which hosted perhaps the most socially egalitarian contingent of adherents
to the Patriot cause, questions of constitutional and political order eclipsed considerations
of social and economic equality.
Further, this study has relevance to the concept of an American Revolutionary
settlement.7 The origins of the American Revolution and the contrast between nationalist
and state sovereigntist visions have been examined at length. Less attention has been paid
to the conflicting political visions that produced divisions within the Patriot cause prior to

For examples of this “Neo-Progressive” approach, see Woody Holton, Forced Founders: Indians,
Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1999); Gary B. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution (New York: Penguin, 2006);
Terry Bouton, Taming Democracy: “The People,” The Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the
American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). For examples of the cultural
interpretation of the Revolution, see Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, This Violent Empire: The Birth of an
American National Identity (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010); Robert G. Parkinson,
The Common Cause: Creating Race and Nation in the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2016).
7
For examples, see John Murrin, “The Great Inversion, or Court versus Country: A Comparison of the
Revolution Settlements in England (1688-1721) and America (1776-1816),” in ed., J.G.A. Pocock, Three
British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776 (Princeton University Press, 1980), 368-453; Aaron N. Coleman,
The American Revolution, State Sovereignty, and the American Constitutional Settlement, 1765-1800
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016).
6
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the resolution of hostilities with Great Britain. Pennsylvania furnishes a great deal of
evidence that conflicting political visions between Whigs were extensive and heavily
informed debates over the state constitutions. Before the American Revolution’s
participants could debate the Revolution’s implications for national affairs, they had to
determine its implications for state politics. The Pennsylvania constitutional debate is a
prime example of an instance in which these questions were debated at length.
This study takes an episodic approach to covering debates over the Pennsylvania
constitution, beginning with its adoption in the summer of 1776 and concluding with the
adjournment of the state Council of Censors in 1784. Chapter One discusses the
background of the American Revolution in Pennsylvania and addresses the content and
general reception of the Pennsylvania constitution. Chapter Two examines the differing
constitutional visions presented in the number of newspaper essays about the Frame of
Government written in 1776 and 1777. Chapter Three assesses the debates of the state
Council of Censors, a constitutionally established body charged with reviewing and
proposing amendments to the state constitution. The concluding section examines the
Pennsylvania constitutional debate as it relates to broader arguments about
constitutionalism and the character and outcome of the American Revolution.
Although this project is limited in its scope and immediate objectives, it should
nonetheless contribute to the scholarly understanding of the Pennsylvania constitution. It
should also enhance the historical understanding of the ways in which constitutional and
political ideology shaped American Whigs’ conflicting understandings of the American
Revolution’s implications. It was, perhaps, only fitting that a struggle precipitated by a
clash of conflicting constitutional interpretations should be the source of extensive
xii

constitutional disagreement within the newly formed United States. The American
Revolution was, at least in Pennsylvania, an internal struggle waged not over questions of
economic and social equality (although those questions were certainly present and
influential), but over distinct and seemingly incompatible visions of political order. These
visions of political order delineated partisans’ interpretations of the Pennsylvania
constitution, which were, in turn, intertwined with their conflicting understandings of the
American Revolution. This study is an effort to make sense of these connections.

xiii

Chapter One: The Background, Content, and Reception of the Pennsylvania
Constitution
Political conflict defined Pennsylvania throughout the Imperial Crisis touched off
by Parliament’s passing of the Stamp Act. Resistance to British imperial policies sparked
resistance to the colony’s proprietary class, which had dominated politics for nearly a
century, and also prompted hostility towards the colony’s substantial population of
Quakers, who also wielded considerable authority under the proprietorship.8
Revolutionary committees, associations, and militias became vehicles through which
opposition was directed against not only the British empire’s policies, but the constituted
authorities of Pennsylvania’s political scene. The colony’s middling and lower classes
transformed the institutions established to protest British policies into instruments for
corroding the stranglehold on Pennsylvania politics maintained by the proprietorship and
the Quakers.9

8

On this development, see James H. Hutson, Pennsylvania Politics, 1746-1770: The Movement for Royal
Government and its Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972). On Pennsylvania politics
prior to the emergence of the American Patriot cause, see Alan Tully, Forming American Politics: Ideals,
Interests, and Institutions in Colonial New York and Pennsylvania (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1994); Richard Beeman, The Varieties of Political Experience in Eighteenth Century
America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), Chapter 8; Nathan Kozuskanich, “ ‘For
the security and protection of the community’: The frontier and the makings of Pennsylvania
constitutionalism,” (Ph.D. Diss., The Ohio State University, 2005); Christopher Pearl, “ ‘For the good order
of government’: The American Revolution and the creation of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 17401790,” (Ph.D. Diss., State University of New York-Binghamton, 2013), Chap. V. On Quakerism and
Pennsylvania politics, see Jane E. Calvert, Quaker Constitutionalism and the Political Thought of John
Dickinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
9
On the radical committees’ role in shaping Revolutionary politics in Pennsylvania, see Richard Alan
Ryerson, The Revolution is Now Begun: The Radical Committees of Philadelphia, 1765-1776
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978) and Kenneth Owen, Political Community in
Revolutionary Pennsylvania, 1774-1800 (Oxford University Press, 2018) Chapter I; on the militias’
importance, see Steven Rosswurm, Arms, Country, and Class: The Philadelphia Militia and ‘Lower Sort’
during the American Revolution, 1775-1783 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987).
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These circumstances enabled mechanics, tradesmen, and artisans to exercise an
unprecedented degree of influence over politics. Intercolonial pressures brought about by
the coming of the War of Independence solidified this impact. Pennsylvania’s political
elite, preoccupied with preserving the proprietary frame of government, hedged their bets
on reconciliation with Britain and opposed independence, even after the start of open
hostilities between colonials and the empire. Clinging also to the pacifist tenets of
Quakerism, they refused to cooperate with the Continental Congress’ requests for
requisitions, maintaining hope of reconciliation with the imperial metropole.10 The
unwillingness of the colony’s established governing figures to accept the cause of
American independence facilitated the emergence of a popularly driven political
movement. The colony’s radical element became the party of the American Revolution in
Pennsylvania, displacing more moderate Whigs from leadership roles and assuming
direction over the colony’s involvement in the Patriot cause. The mantle of forging
intercolonial cooperation fell to them, as they cooperated with the Continental Congress
and thus became, so far as national affairs were concerned, the group in control of
administering the war effort.
The radicals also undertook a campaign to replace the proprietorship, which they
regarded as overly exclusionary in its dispensation of political power. They desired not
only independence from Britain, but the replacement of the proprietary government with

Jessica Chopin Roney, “Government Without Arms, Arms Without Government: The Case of
Pennsylvania,” in Patrick Griffin, Brian Schoen, Peter S. Onuf, and Robert G. Ingram, eds., Between
Sovereignty and Anarchy: The Politics of Violence in the American Revolutionary Era (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 2015), 84-86
10
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a new political order.11 The extent to which they intended to abandon the precedents of
the state’s colonial history and establish a government directly representing the will of
the people became apparent through their creation of a new constitution for the state of
Pennsylvania in July of 1776.
On May 10, 1776, the Continental Congress issued a resolve recommending that
each colony “adopt such government as shall, in the opinion of the representatives of the
people, best conduce to the safety and happiness of their constituents in particular, and
America in general.”12 Pennsylvania Whigs answered this call by convening in
Philadelphia in July to hammer out a new constitution and establish statehood. Like the
Revolutionary committees that preceded it, this convention was comprised mostly of
mechanics, tradesmen, and artisans. Its members were men of common stock who had,
with only a couple of notable exceptions, been untouched by much fame or distinction
outside of Pennsylvania.13 Benjamin Franklin and the watchmaker David Rittenhouse
were the only two attendees of much reputation, and Franklin was likely only present at
the convention for a brief interlude. While these men had assumed roles of increasing
political importance through their involvement with the Revolutionary associations and
militia, they had been excluded from positions of defining influence in state politics prior
to the onset of the War. Their engagement in, first, cooperating with the Continental

11

This was evident in their criticisms of the proprietorship in a string of pamphlets written early in 1776.
See Ryerson, The Revolution is Now Begun, 169-170. See also, Benjamin L. Carp, Rebels Rising: Cities
and the American Revolution (Oxford University Press, 2007), 172-212.
12
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, 342. Accessed at http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/query/D?hlaw:4:./temp/~ammem_PvSt::.
13
Robert Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1981), 637. Also see Charles S. Olton, Artisans for Independence: Philadelphia
Mechanics and the American Revolution (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1975).
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Congress to provide supplies and manpower for the war effort and, secondly, framing the
state constitution, catapulted them to preeminence in state affairs. The onset of armed
conflict and the coming of independence had provided them with the opportunity to
eclipse Pennsylvania’s entrenched political classes and become the principal movers in
charting the state’s newfound course of government.14
Pennsylvania’s Revolutionary leaders harbored tremendous disdain for the state’s
former ruling class. Their resentment towards those they displaced from power animated
their attempt at creating a government suitable to both the exigencies of war and the
demands of popular politics. They denounced those who had previously dominated
Pennsylvania politics as “a minority of rich men” and “an aristocratical junto” that had
exerted every effort to “make the common and middle class of people their beasts of
burden.”15 A letter circulated by the Philadelphia militia concerning the selection of
delegates to the constitutional convention warned against electing “great and over-grown
rich Men,” noting their propensity for framing “Distinctions in society.”16
Their distaste for the elites who had previously been at the helm was so intense that
the state constitutional convention considered “whether the future legislature of this State
should have the power of lessening property when it became excessive in individuals.” A
provision included in a preliminary draft of the Declaration of Rights set forth in the state
constitution warned against “an enormous Proportion of Property vested in a few

14

Ryerson, The Revolution is Now Begun and Kenneth Owen, Political Community in Revolutionary
Pennsylvania, 19-36.
15
Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1969), 86.
16
John Murrin, “An American Ruling Class,” in Murrin, Rethinking America: From Empire to Republic
(Oxford University Press, 2018), 263.
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Individuals,” and provided that such a state of affairs should be “discouraged by the laws
of the state.”17 These measures were rejected by the convention, but they attested to a
levelling impulse within the state’s revolutionary movement. This levelling tendency
aimed at a social restructuring of Pennsylvania politics, although it did not aspire to
economically reshape society through government action.18
I.
The Pennsylvania Constitution
I do declare that I do not hold myself bound to bear Allegiance to George the
Third, King of Great-Britain; And that I will steadily and firmly and at all Times
promote the most effectual means, according to the best of my Skill and
Knowledge, to oppose the tyrannical Proceedings of the King and Parliament of
Great-Britain against the American colonies, and support a Government in this
State on the authority of the People only…
--John Morris, July 177619
This pledge, taken by the Secretary of Pennsylvania’s constitutional convention
shortly after the body gathered, signaled the joint objectives of Pennsylvania’s most
radical supporters of Independence. The authors of the Pennsylvania constitution thought
that the realization of independence and the creation of a government grounded in the
“authority of the people only” were interchangeable and synonymous. In their view, the
American Revolution was not merely a struggle to throw off the yoke of British control.
Independence was essential, but it needed to be accompanied by the creation of a state
government which fully accounted for, and was energized by, the popular will. This
objective, to a certain extent a product of the members’ outsider status and egalitarian
leanings, but also a product of their conceptualization of popular sovereignty (a topic

17

Wood, Creation, 89.
Murrin, “An American Ruling Class,” 264.
19
Minutes of the proceedings of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania, held at Philadelphia, the
fifteenth day of July, 1776 (Philadelphia, 1776), 5.
18
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addressed at greater length in the next chapter), led them to produce a constitution far
more democratic than any of the other state constitutions created at the outset of the War
for Independence.
The constitution they devised consisted of three sections: an introduction
enumerating the colony’s reasons for separating from Britain (similar to the various
Declarations of Independency issued by the other state governments and the Declaration
of Independence adopted by the Continental Congress), a fairly standard Declaration of
Rights listing rights reserved to the commonwealth’s citizens, and a Frame of
Government outlining the design and operation of the new state government.20
The first two sections provoked minimal controversy. The Declaration of Rights
was squarely a part of the Anglo-American tradition of enumerating individual rights.21 It
established the individual right to life, liberty, property, happiness, and safety; the right to
assemble to discuss political affairs and grievances, the right to bear arms; and religious
freedom (an element reflecting Pennsylvania’s longstanding tradition of religious
toleration). It counterposed those rights with the responsibilities of the citizenry: the
payment of just taxes, military service, and the responsibility to “continually oversee”
state officials.22 The Declaration reflected a variety of influences. The influence of the
English common law was evident its enshrinement of liberties, the recognition of those
rights as existing in the absence and in possible opposition to government attested to the

20

On the numerous Declarations of Independence adopted by the nascent American states, see Maier,
American Scripture.
21
On this tradition, see John Phillip Reid, Rule of Law: The Jurisprudence of Liberty in the Seventeenth
and Eighteenth Centuries (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004); The Ancient Constitution and
the Origins of Anglo-American Liberty (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2005).
22
Constitution of Pennsylvania, September 28, 1776. Accessed at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/pa08.asp.,
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influence of liberal thought, and republican influences were apparent in its articulation of
the civic duties of citizens.23 It was the product of a multiplicity of influences and a
testament to the intellectually heterogeneous nature of American constitutional thought.
Most importantly, the Declaration articulated a vision of the people’s relationship
to the government and the nature of political authority in Pennsylvania.24 It unequivocally
announced both that the people were the source of political authority and that the
constitution was intended to place them fully in control of Pennsylvania politics.
Affirming popular sovereignty as the central tenet of the new state government, the
Declaration expressed the people’s “sole, exclusive, and inherent right,” of “governing
and regulating” the state’s internal police.25 It stated that power was “originally inherent
in, and consequently derived from,” the people. This made “officers of government” the
“trustees and servants” of the people.26 Government officials could therefore be
“reduce[d]… to a private station,” should they prove unsatisfactory in the execution of

23

On the place of liberalism in Anglo-American thought and discourse, see Louis Hartz, The Liberal
Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955); Isaac Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle:
The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); Gary Wills,
Inventing America: Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978); Joyce
Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York University
Press, 1984) and Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1992); Lee Ward, The Politics of Liberty in England and Revolutionary America
(Cambridge University Press, 2004); Craig Yirush, Settlers, Liberty, and Empire: The Roots of Early
American Political Theory, 1675-1775 (Cambridge University Press, 2011). On republicanism, see Bernard
Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967);
Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1969); J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the
Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton University Press, 1975); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian
Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978); Robert E. Shalhope,
“Republicanism and Early American Historiography,” William and Mary Quarterly 39, no. 2 (April, 1982),
334-56; Daniel T. Rodgers, “Republicanism: the Career of a Concept,” Journal of American History 79, no.
1 (June, 1992), 11-38.
24
Jeffrey L. Bauman, “Pennsylvania: Liberty, Independence, and Virtue,” in eds. George E. Connor and
Christopher W. Hammons, The Constitutionalism of the American States (Columbia: University of
Missouri Press, 2008), 250.
25
State Constitution, Declaration of Rights, Clause III.
26
Ibid., Clause IV.
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their duties.27 The constitution acknowledged that the people had other recourses against
governmental abuse of power that extended beyond the recalling of representatives.
Affirming perhaps the greatest concession to popular sovereignty and sounding distinctly
Lockean, the constitution recognized the people’s authority to “reform, alter,” or even to
“abolish government,” in order to secure the general welfare.28
These clauses set forth a vision of a government conducive to the collective good
of the commonwealth and directly accountable to the governed. Section V’s expression
of the importance of promoting the common welfare over the interests of private parties
is a telling indicator of the authors’ commitment to a vision of popularly controlled
government devoid of factional divisions. The constitution aimed for a promotion of
collective interests over those of factions.29
The Declaration established the “common benefit, protection, and security,” as
the object of government. Eschewing the idea that government should provide an avenue
for factions or interests to acquire power or wealth, it avowed that the government would
not work towards “the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or
sort of men.”30 These clauses set forth a vision of a government conducive to the
collective good of the commonwealth and directly accountable to the governed. Unlike
the interpretation of the imperial constitution presented by defenders of Parliament, the
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Pennsylvania constitution affirmed the direct power of the people to exercise control over
their government; there was no hint of virtual representation in the constitution’s
introduction.31 Simultaneously promoting popular control and the general welfare, the
constitution seemed to suggest that its framers thought those goals to be directly
consonant with one another.
The Frame of Government set forth in the constitution’s third and final section
created an institutional framework that incorporated the ethos of democratic government
explicated in the Declaration. It created a framework that made unprecedented
concessions to the popular will. It established a unicameral legislature, one-year terms of
office for state legislators, and mandated that laws be published for public consideration
and that their enactment be delayed until after the adjournment of the legislative session
in which they were introduced. These measures established mechanisms through which
the electorate could exercise a tight control over their legislative affairs.32
The constitution also dramatically expanded the scope of the electorate. It gave
the franchise to all taxpaying males aged twenty-one or over.33 By eschewing property
qualifications, the constitution established a political process in which wealth was not a
barrier to participation. This ensured that the majority of the people (a term whose reach
was still limited to adult white males) could engage in political affairs and that the
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interests of society as a whole, and not just the interests of property-holders, could be
taken into account.
While the constitution expanded the size of the electorate and thus, in
combination with its grant of power to the legislature, promised to enhance the people’s
influence on politics, its concessions to popular authority were not without qualification.
The constitution mandated that officeholders take a loyalty oath under which they would
pledge both to “be true and faithful to the commonwealth of Pennsylvania” and to “not
directly or indirectly do any act or thing prejudicial or injurious to the constitution
thereof.” Here, the constitution’s authors seemed to anticipate (incorrectly, it turned out)
that the harmonious state of affairs envisioned in the constitution would be realized and
that the constitution would enjoy general, if not unanimous, support across the state.
Evidencing their conviction that the interests of the Commonwealth and the maintenance
of the constitution were one and the same, the framers bound all public officials to swear
allegiance to the constitution.34
The constitution’s authors deviated from the proprietary frame of government in
place throughout Pennsylvania’s history as a colony by creating an executive branch
without a governor and by placing the judiciary under the thumb of the legislature. It
established a plural executive comprised of a supreme executive council and a president,
and it did not create an executive veto.35 The council consisted of twelve members, who
were only allowed to serve for three years at a time before being barred from resuming
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office for a period of four years.36 The judicial branch was not afforded the customary
protections it had previously received under the propriety government. Justices were
appointed by the Council for seven years terms and could be reappointed--but they were
subject to removal by the Assembly at any time, a power which later brought
controversy.37 These provisions placed the executive and judicial branches in a
subordinate position vis a vis the state legislature. The executive could not check the
actions of the legislature--and was therefore unable to prevent the Assembly from
removing justices of the state Supreme Court at will. The constitution thus effectively
gave the legislature preeminence in the new state government.
These provisions signaled a radical departure from traditional Anglo-American
notions regarding the separation of powers, expressed most notably in Montesquieu’s The
Spirit of the Laws.38 Legislative preeminence, generally brought about through the
actions of the lower houses of the colonial assemblies, had been a trend in the thirteen
colonies throughout the eighteenth century. However, never had an American charter or
constitution established so much formal power in a legislature and so clearly afforded the
executive and judicial components such a clearly secondary place in the distribution of
power.39 The framers of the Pennsylvania constitution appear to have shared with their
counterparts in the other states an abiding fear of executive overreach that led them to
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create an ineffectual and subservient executive component. However, they went well
beyond the other state constitutions by creating an executive council, rather than a
governor, and providing for no executive veto over laws passed by the legislature.
It is difficult to identify the direct inspiration for the system of government
created under the constitution. Some of the frame of government’s features had been
proposed in pamphlets published shortly before the constitutional convention met.40
While the shortage of extant records detailing the convention’s debates makes
determining the influences of the constitution’s framers a nearly impossible task, it is
probably fair to suggest that they were guided by these proposals. Thomas Paine likely
furnished further influence, as he was closely associated with several the convention’s
members and had promoted unicameralism in Common Sense.41
Whatever their influences and inspirations, the authors of the state constitution
created a system of government remarkably different from both the charters of the
colonial period and the constitutions their contemporaries from other states were writing.
In creating a unicameral legislature with the power to dominate state politics, the
constitution’s authors took the implications of the concept of popular sovereignty to more
extreme conclusions than any of their counterparts. The Frame of Government was an
attempt to create political institutions capable of facilitating rule by the people and, by
extension, militating against the dominance of the elite interests that had traditionally
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been at the helm of Pennsylvania politics. The constitution established a framework for
government that, rather than indirectly and dispassionately representing the interests of
the people, was directly subject to their oversight and control.
The governmental framework established under the constitution was animated by
the concept of popular sovereignty, or the notion that all political authority was derived
from the people.42 This idea commanded almost universal acknowledgment among
Americans. It was a common truism that the people were sovereign. However, most
Americans in 1776 still thought that, while in theory sovereignty resided with the people,
carefully calculated constraints on the political agency of the people were necessary to
ensure governmental stability.43
The authors of the Pennsylvania constitution departed from this general wisdom.
While they still worked under the assumption that representation was necessary and that a
purely democratic government would be inoperable, they afforded a greater degree of
power to the people than most Americans were willing to concede. They did this by
rejecting prevailing notions about the balance of power and making the legislature the
preeminent part of the state government. Rather than distributing power in ways that
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checked the influence of the people over government and appealing to an ideal of
deferential politics, as the authors of most of the other state constitutions did, the
Pennsylvania framers created a structure which gave authority to the agents of the people
and made them directly responsible to their constituents in ways that had not previously
been realized.44 Political power in Pennsylvania was a stream flowing from a spigot
which the people could turn at any moment.
This effort to instantiate directly the authority of the people within the structures
of government prompted staunch criticism. Supporters of the proprietorship objected to
the constitution’s displacement of the governmental structure that had existed throughout
Pennsylvania’s colonial history. Their concerns about the content of the constitution were
compounded by their objections to the manner in which it was adopted—the Assembly
that had produced the document was an extralegal body unaccountable to the people. The
constitution’s opponents argued that the nature of the frame of government’s creation
rendered it illegitimate. The Assembly had operated in an extralegal manner to establish a
system which, while democratic in its proposals, had not actually been subject to popular
approval. The critics of the constitution emphasized the apparent hypocrisy inherent to
this method of establishing a government (although it is worth noting that the other state
constitutions were adopted in extralegal manners and were not subject to direct popular
approval).45
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Critics also objected to convention delegates’ common background and apparent
ignorance of political affairs. One observer referred to the delegates as a group of “plain
countrymen,”; another bluntly dismissed them as “numsculs.” Even Thomas Smith, a
delegate to the convention, complained that “not a sixth part of us ever read a word,”
concerning government.46 Opponents of the constitution seized upon what they regarded
as its authors’ unrefined backgrounds and ignorance of political affairs. The
constitution’s critics believed that the members of the convention had violated the
established norms of political deference, rising above their allotted station and revealing
their inability to create a government worthy of preservation.
The state constitution’s apparent radicalism prompted criticism from moderate
Whigs, including some, such as Benjamin Rush, Christopher Marshall, and Thomas
McKean, who had been active proponents of Independence and open critics of the
proprietary government. They recoiled at the domination of politics by a “mobocracy,”
viewing the constitution’s provisions for popular rule as the extreme product of
Pennsylvania’s most radical acolytes of popular liberty. John Adams voiced a similar
opinion, exclaiming “Good God!” on his first reading of the constitution and observing
that the people of Pennsylvania would soon “be glad to petition the crown of Britain for
reconciliation” to escape “the tyranny of their Constitution.”47 Adams’ criticism of the
state constitution is unsurprising, considering his staunch advocacy of the separation of
powers and bicameralism in “Thoughts on Government,” which Adams wrote in response
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to Thomas Paine’s argument in Common Sense that the ideal government was one
comprised of a single-chamber legislature, an elected judiciary bound by a single term,
and a weak executive--a vision reflected in the state constitution.48 While Adams argued
that legislatures should be “in miniature an exact portrait of the people at large,” he
contended that unicameral legislatures were dangerous because they possessed no
internal checks, and he further maintained that the exercise of executive and judicial
powers by the legislature was an essential threat to the maintenance of a balance of
powers between the three branches of government.49
The broader debate that emerged in Pennsylvania mirrored the disagreement
between Paine and Adams. It was a contest which pitted a distinct vision of direct
government by the people against a more prevalent conception of deferential government,
in which the people were acknowledged as the source of political authority but their
ability to exercise that power was constrained by a carefully maintained institutional
equilibrium. While much of the debate consisted of wrangling over specific provisions of
the constitution, the contest essentially revolved around this fundamental difference in
outlook. Further, these conflicting visions of political society and constitutional order
intersected with the partisans’ differing understandings of the meaning of the American
Revolution. These differences framed the contours of political discourse in Pennsylvania
throughout the waging of the War of Independence. They attest to the centrality of
constitutional ideology to political discourse during the Revolutionary period. As the next
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chapter demonstrates, the constitution’s adoption and implementation provided the
occasion for these distinct visions to be articulated. The newspaper debate that ensued in
the wake of the constitution’s publication provided a forum for these understandings to
be expressed at length.

17

Chapter Two: Debating the Constitution in the Press, 1776-1778
All government supposes power, and power can exist only by delegation. Why
then should the people by the Constitution of Pennsylvania, in so many cases,
refuse to part with their power when it is given wholly to their servants who are
bound by a thousand ties to employ it only for their benefit, and who must return
it to them every year? The people in this case resemble a man who bequeaths his
estate to himself, and afterwards appoints himself his own executor.50
--“K,” Pennsylvania Packet, September 24, 1776

In 1811, Alexander Graydon published a memoir detailing his experiences living
in Pennsylvania over the course of the previous six decades. In addition to recounting a
personal narrative, Graydon addressed the political trends the state had experienced
during that period. Graydon articulated a vision of popular government in alignment with
that of the authors of the state constitution of 1776. The “source of power,” he wrote,
“has been diligently explored and discovered too…and universal suffrage, with the right
to pull down and build up again, thence recognized as fundamental.” He noted that this
discovery had completely upended prevailing notions about the balance of power; it had
the potential to “puzzle the learned advocates for strong executives, and independent
judiciaries, and in the end, perhaps, turn all their well-spun theories into lumber, little
better than nonsense.”51
Graydon’s perception of political trends in Pennsylvania aligned closely with the
realities of the state during the American Revolution. The conception of popular
sovereignty as a precept whose realization had the power to render “strong executives,
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and independent judiciaries,” unnecessary was central to the way that the supporters of
the state constitution presented its Frame of Government. Principally articulating their
vision through a series of newspaper essays, these defenders of the constitution argued
that the authority of the people, which they viewed as essential to the Revolution,
necessitated a rejection of prevailing notions about the dispersion of political power.
Graydon was, further, correct in recalling that this conception of popular sovereignty
perplexed and discomfited those who believed that “strong executives and independent
judiciaries” were indispensable to balanced government.52
Graydon was incorrect, however, in presenting this development as an
uncontested triumph for the Constitutionalists’ direct reading of popular sovereignty.
Those who opposed the constitution assailed the notion that the power of the people
could be reconciled with a government which did not establish a clearly balanced
dispensation of authority among the branches of government. They argued that the
constitution’s establishment of a unicameral legislature occupying a place of preeminence
in the state government provided the basis for the government’s degeneration into an
arbitrary regime.53
Graydon’s account provides a useful overview of the basic fault lines that
separated the constitution’s supporters and opponents. Their visions of constitutional
order, premised on conflicting visions of government and divergent notions about the
purpose of the American Revolution and its proper direction, were presented in the
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newspaper essays written in the aftermath of the constitution’s adoption. These essays
provide a window into understanding the extent and nature of the ideological divisions
between the two factions in the constitutional debate.
The disagreement on issues of constitutional structure and the dispersion of power
that emerged in the aftermath of the constitutional convention persisted throughout 1776.
The suitability of legislative preeminence and the limits of republican government were
central themes in Pennsylvania discourse. The public sphere provided a forum for the
constitution’s supporters and opponents to make their case through a variety of
arguments.54
While evidence of these issues’ hold on public consideration can be found in
public documents, their place in political debate is most apparent in a number of
newspaper essays written in 1776. Supporters of the constitution championed its
facilitation of popular rule through the establishment of an annually elected and
remarkably powerful Assembly. In their eyes, the constitution’s success at realizing, to an
unprecedented degree, the principle of popular sovereignty meant that revision or
abandonment of the document were not only unnecessary measures, but efforts to
undermine the cause of popular government, which they equated with the cause of
Independence. Opponents of the constitution argued that the framers of the constitution
had gone entirely too far in their efforts to realize the doctrine of popular sovereignty.
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They recognized the people as sovereign but believed that their power needed to be
diffused across multiple branches of government and thereby restrained. They saw their
proposals to either reform or replace the constitution as sound and moderate efforts to
ensure governmental stability and avoid disastrous internal calamity in the midst of an
uncertain war with Great Britain.
These positions framed the contours of the public debates over the constitution that
took place in 1776 and 1777. Although not every partisan of the constitution believed that
the document was faultless, and not every critic of the constitution argued that the Frame
of Government was irredeemably flawed, disagreement on governmental structure was
the common thread that bound together the majority of the newspaper essays on the
constitution written during this period. Further, partisans of both positions argued that
their respective stances on the state constitution--and, by extension, their conflicting
visions of governmental order--were bound up with the cause of successfully prosecuting
the War for Independence and securing the principles of the American Revolution.
I.

Governmental Structure and the Role of the People

The constitution’s establishment of a unicameral legislature was a source of
enormous controversy within newspaper debates over the constitution. Supporters of the
constitution argued that a unicameral legislature was the best means of directly securing
the liberties of the people because it encapsulated the interests of the entire political
community within a single body. They further argued that it militated against the
emergence of “aristocratic” interests, which they contended had historically dominated
within upper legislative houses. Critics turned upside down the notion that a second
21

legislative branch was necessary to provide legislative wisdom and serve as a check on
the lower house, noting upper houses’ traditional role as a vehicle for distinguished
members of society to exercise their influence over political affairs. The elite-centric
nature of upper houses was, they contended, a threat and not an asset.
Further debate centered around the legislature’s relationship to the other two
branches of government. The powers granted the legislature under the constitution
effectively made it the preeminent part of the state government. Supporters of the Frame
of Government either argued that the constitution provided enough alternative checks on
legislative power (through means such as annual elections or the delaying of legislative
enactment until the opening of the following year’s legislative session) to constrain it, or
that the legislature’s role as the representative of the people meant that it should wield a
preponderance of the distribution of power.
“K,” one of the first authors to comment on the constitution, invoked the
republican notion that the “weakness and depravity of human nature” made “proper
restraints” on both liberty and power necessary. They conceded that unicameral
legislatures would be ideal “If men were wise and virtuous as angels,” but noted that
human nature had made compound legislatures a staple of free governments. The
tendency of “liberty to run into licentiousness,” made restraints on legislative power a
necessity, and “K” argued that an upper house of the legislature would ensure that the
Assembly remained within the bounds of power prescribed by human errancy.55
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“Demophilus” acknowledged such arguments on behalf of an upper house but
argued that Pennsylvania’s peculiar social composition made such an institution
impractical. While the essayist recognized the “wisdom of the most learned and
experienced members of the state,” he argued that Pennsylvania did not boast a large
enough class of distinguished individuals to assemble an upper chamber of the
legislature. Pennsylvanians were, he argued, “farmers, men of moderate education,
possessed of common sense,” but lacking much background in “the history laws or
politics, even of their own, not to mention other states.” Demophilus thought “The best
assembly of farmers merchants, and mechanics that could be picked out of the united
states, would hardly be equal to the task of framing one regular digest.” Their natural
incapacity for government, would, however, be alleviated by the nature of a unicameral
assembly; “Demophilus,” argued that single-chamber legislatures were more conducive
to consideration of “what is RIGHT’ than of abstract questions of political philosophy.
Further, the essayist ultimately concluded that there were so few individuals in
Pennsylvania qualified to serve as members of an upper chamber that creating such an
institution would ensconce an aristocracy within the state government and render the
common citizens of the state incapable of promoting their own interests against those of
their superiors.56
“Camillus” took the notion of popular control over the legislature to even greater
lengths, rejecting the suggestion that any other branch of government could exercise a
negative over actions taken by the Assembly. Arguing that “The more simple, and the
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more immediately dependant the authority is on the people, the better; because it must be
allowed, that they themselves are the best guardians of their own liberties.” The
implication of this popular possession of political authority was that the legislature
needed to be the preeminent branch. It channeled the will of the people and therefore
could not delegate a negative over its authority to another body. This meant that only the
people could legitimately exercise a check against the power of the legislature.57
An article entitled “Remarks on the Resolves published against the Plan of
Government, by a gentleman of neither party,” argued that the constitution had
maintained elements of a balance of power while abandoning those aspects that offended
the sensibilities of Pennsylvanians. Despite the author’s professed detachment from the
emerging partisan divide engulfing the state, he offered a number of arguments on behalf
of the constitution. The essayist found that the constitution had in fact established an
independent judiciary through its provisions for septennial terms of office and fixed
salaries for judges. The author argued that the executive’s presumed “dependance” on the
legislature was “mostly imaginary, and where it is real, it is but a continuance of our
former practice, which so many esteem and admire.” The essayist contended that
Republicans’ efforts to establish a balanced government had led them to propose a
recreation of an English-style mixed regime that was inconsistent with the social
composition of Pennsylvania. Republicans were “evidently exalting the English plan of
King, Lords, and Commons, in the ideas of a people possessed of different ranks suitable
thereto…but where are our Nobles? Or who dreams of a King of Pennsylvania?”
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Pennsylvania society was, the author believed, far too egalitarian for such a system to
function properly. A classical governmental order, in which different elements of the
government corresponded with distinct societal interests, could not survive in a society as
broadly egalitarian as Pennsylvania.58
The author’s characterization of Republicans as proponents of a mixed regime
was rhetorically powerful but inaccurate. Contrary to the essayist’s contentions,
Republicans were not supportive of a classical-style order in which the interests of the
one, the few, and the many were vested in separate branches and set in counterpoise to
one another. Rather, the ardency with which they promoted a balance of power resulted
from a desire for a balanced government controlled by the people but subject to a series
of institutional constraints on their power. Despite their opponents’ characterization of
them as reactionary stalwarts, Republicans were proposing balanced government—at the
time a revolutionary concept—not the mixed regime of classical politics.
The author further contended that the legislature could assume powers beyond the
domain of lawmaking without becoming tyrannical, noting that the state Assembly had
created a Committee of Safety comprised of its own members the previous winter.
Beyond simply being a refutation of established assumptions about the delineation of
powers among branches of government, this notion was a justification for extralegal
government under the auspices of promoting the common safety and general welfare of
the state. The author seemed to believe that the exigencies facing the state sanctioned a

58

Pennsylvania Evening Post, November 9, 1776.

25

broad degree of legislative discretion to take any action necessary to promote the state’s
safety.59
“One of the People” argued that those intent on establishing an upper house
wanted such an institution because of its “lordly powers to direct and controul the
Commons.” The author rejected the Republican assertion that the “fatal influence of
hasty, incorrect, passionate and prejudiced determinations” would prevail should a lower
house “consisting chiefly of farmers and mechanics,” be established and criticized the
notion that the “other House will be famed for wise, prudent, just and well judged
counsels.” The essayist appealed to English history as an example of the merits of a lower
house, observing that the House of Commons was the principal instrument within the
English government for the advancement of liberty: “They were brave, prudent, and
eloquent, they were the guardians of liberty, the glory of Britain and an honor to
mankind.” The House of Lords, by contrast, had only served as a roadblock to the work
of the House of Commons on behalf of liberty.
The essayist further suggested that an upper house would inevitably become as
corrupt and aristocratic as he believed the House of Lords was. The author suggested that
the “sons of wisdom” who would occupy seats in an upper chamber would eventually
refuse to “submit to yearly elections by the ignorant vulgar,” pushing for longer terms of
office and eventually demanding “places and pensions to support their dignity.” “One of
the People” argued that the upper house would be able to effectively deploy assumptions
about the “passion and prejudice” of the lower chamber to prevent the lower house from
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checking its members’ efforts to aggrandize power and influence. The result would be
that “every leader must have a place of honor, or profit, or an annuity for life for
betraying the state,” a development which had occurred within the House of Lords and
could easily be simulated in America, as “we know that what has happened in Britain
may happen in America.” “One of the People” cited English historical example in
rebuttal to the theoretical arguments about the necessity of an upper house raised by
opponents of the constitution.60
“The Considerate Freeman” submitted that the equal and representative nature of
the legislature was sufficient insurance against the possibility of its members behaving
tyrannically. The author saw the legislature as an embodiment of the ideal of actual
representation:
it consists of a body of men, chosen in every part of the State by the free voice of
the people for whom they are to legislate, and proportioned on the true principles
of representation, so that every man has a voice in delegating the man who is to
give away his money, or make the laws by which he is to be bound, and no man
has a greater voice than another…By this means the whole State becomes its own
council, and every freeman in it is a counsellor, and the negative lies in the whole
body politic, and not in a few grandees.61

The author contended that the entire citizenry of Pennsylvania was represented by the
legislature. Rather than representing merely a select segment of the general population,
the Assembly would represent the interests of every element of the political community.
Where upper houses could easily “gratify their ambition and thirst for power at the
expence of the people,” because the nature of an upper chamber placed distance between
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its members and the people, the Assembly could not become “ambitious and tyrannical”
without jeopardizing its members own interests, because pursuing such a course would
require them to “exercise its [the legislature’s] projects on itself.” This representative
character, “A Considerate Freeman” contended, would be reinforced by the constitution’s
provisions for annual elections, term limits, and transparency in the legislature’s
meetings, which would ensure that the legislature’s members could not acquire an excess
of power or operate in ways that contradicted the wishes of their constituents.62
Constitutionalist arguments in support of the legislature established under the
Frame of Government were greeted with swift and robust resistance by Republicans.
Republicans’ criticisms of the constitution’s unicameral and preeminent legislature
centered primarily around the notions that unicameral legislatures gave too much direct
power to the people without any internal check and that a preeminent legislature upset the
separation of powers necessary to prevent a single governing body from acquiring an
excess of power.
“Scipio,” attributed the success of the constitutions written in neighboring states
to their removal solely of the monarchical elements of their constitutions and their
retention of upper legislative houses and governorships. The essayist argued that a people
capable of attaining freedom and happiness under a unicameral legislature “might be
equally free and happy without any government,” arguing that “Both situations suppose
equal degrees of virtue in a people.” The virtue of the people alone was insufficient to
secure liberty; it could only be acquired through a balanced government. “Scipio”
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rejected the republican idea that civic virtue was the bulwark of liberty, instead
embracing the notion that governmental structures intended to restrain the dangerous
impulses of the masses were the best means of achieving it.63
“Samuel Howell” expressed anticonstitutionalists’ support for a “mixed and
tempered legislature.” Unlike most of the constitution’s critics, the author suggested that
the constitution was conducive to economic division. He envisioned a perpetual contest
between the wealthy and the impoverished, averring Republicans’ desire for “a
government that shall not suffer the rich and poor alternately to be the prey of each
other.” He contended that “prejudices and passions of the WHOLE community” had been
“let loose upon every man’s property, liberty, and life” through the legislature, the courts,
and the Council of Censors. The fundamental problem, “Howell” contended, was that the
people had “UNDONE themselves by a hasty and ill-judged exercise of their OWN
power.” By concentrating the entire power of the political community within a single
venue (the legislature), the people had made themselves functionally supreme. This
empowered the people as a collective, but endangered their individual lives, liberty, and
property by unleashing the collective from the restraints embedded within a more
conventionally balanced system.64
“One of the People” expressed profound uneasiness with the idea of a preeminent
legislature. Commenting on the legislature’s power to determine terms of office, the
author argued that “the monster prerogative” threatened the rights of citizens by
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subjecting them to the oversight of “mere arbitrary edict[s]” instead of carefully
sanctioned protocol for governance. The author rejoiced that the constitution had reserved
the power of amendment to the Council of Censors, arguing that such a power in the
hands of the Assembly would make them “as absolute masters of the lives and fortunes of
their constituents in Pennsylvania” as Parliament had been over British subjects.65
“Hampden” stressed the resemblance between the broad scope of powers granted
the Assembly by the constitution and the supremacy asserted by Parliament during the
Imperial Crisis: “Our Assembly is an omnipotent body. Like the British Parliament they
have a right to bind us in all cases whatever.—They are unlimited in the extent and
exercise of their power.” This absolute power was magnified by the absence of any
mechanisms through which the people could militate against the legislature’s authority;
the people had “no Legislative Council, or Governor to check their violence.”
“Hampden” contended that a legislature wielding unrestrained power was potentially just
as dangerous to the fundamental rights of the governed as an absolute monarch: “Where
is the man that would give up the absolute disposal of his property, liberty, or life for
seven years, or even for one year, to any one man in the world?...the freemen of
Pennsylvania have suffered one body of men to usurp an absolute power over their
property, liberty, and lives for one year by their laws; and for seven years by their
constitution.” Although Hampden contended that the scope of the legislature’s authority
was a product of its disregard for the constitution, the extent of the Assembly’s powers
was outlined in the constitution and, even if it acted in ways contradictory of the Frame
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of Government, the source of Hampden’s objection seemed to be the author’s concern
that the other branches possessed far too little power to check the legislature.
A gathering of critics of the constitution in the Philadelphia state-yard on October
22 issued a series of criticisms of the constitution, including their objections to its clauses
pertaining to the legislature. They noted the constitution’s differences from “those lately
formed,” especially paying attention to its legislative clauses. They objected to the
legislature’s unicameral nature and to the dependence of the judicial and executive
branches upon the Assembly. They specifically pointed to the legislature’s power of
removal over judges and its ability to determine the membership of the Supreme
Executive Council and alter the members’ salaries at will. The Republican critics upheld
the separation of powers, “The several powers, being separated and distributed into
different hands, for checks one upon another,” as “the only effectual mode ever invented
by men to promote their freedom and prosperity.” They argued that the notion of the new
state government as a balanced one was utterly false and that “in truth the legislative,
executive, and judicial powers may be said to be united in one body, the Assembly.”66
Critics also objected to the notion that the people of Pennsylvania could be
expected to render the level of civic engagement necessary to effectively govern
themselves. “Andrew Marvell” rejected the notion that a check on legislative power
could be placed “in the hands of the people at large” instead of within a legislative
council. Where “Demophilus” had argued that the absence of a large number of
distinguished citizens necessitated a unicameral legislature consisting only of a lower
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house, “Andrew Marvell” argued that it made a functioning lower house an impossibility.
“Marvell” noted that a purely popular Assembly would require “all men to possess equal
understanding, knowledge, and leisure,” a mandate that could not be upheld in reality. It
would further require the people to forgo their personal livelihoods, forcing “the
husbandman” to “neglect his farm,” “the merchant” to “forsake his compting-house,” and
“the tradesman shut up his shop to examine the acts of every session of Assembly.”
Moreover, the distance separating towns and villages made it highly impractical for the
residents of counties to gather after every legislative session “to debate and vote in a
tumultuary manner upon their laws, and afterwards instruct their members to confirm or
reject them.” “Marvell” believed that both the hierarchy of “understanding, knowledge,
and leisure” and the realities of agricultural and commercial activities made a directly
representative legislature prohibitively difficult to achieve.67
“Ludlow” criticized the constitution’s egalitarian premises, arguing that they were
“wholly repugnant to the principles of action in man” and certain “to check the progress
of genius and virtue in human nature.” The constitution had ignored the pervasive
inequalities in “property, wisdom and virtue among the inhabitants of the state,”
mistakenly presupposing “perfect equality” in those traits. This failure to properly
grapple with human nature had produced an inability to represent the distinctions
between legislative, executive, and judicial powers. “Ludlow” contended that these
functions had been “jumbled together in a most unsystematic manner.” These failings
combined to produce a constitution that completely elided both social and economic
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differences and the distinctions in governmental power that republican theorists had
asserted were essential to a balanced government. The attempt to produce an equal and
representative government through the constitution had instead resulted in the inverse: a
government that failed to represent both social reality and the realities of governance.68
Benjamin Rush echoed these critiques in a pamphlet published in 1777. Sounding
nearly identical to “Ludlow” (and apparently revealing either the influence of that author
or indicating that Rush himself had written that essay), Rush contended that the
constitution “supposes perfect equality, and an equal distribution of property, wisdom,
and virtue, among the inhabitants of the state.” Rather than vesting legislative, executive,
and judicial powers in separate and distinct branches, Rush contended that the
constitution had them “jumbled together in a most unsystematic manner.”69
Rush criticized the constitution for effectively granting the legislature carte
blanche to operate as it wished. The constitution, he contended, had placed the “supreme,
absolute, and uncontrouled power of the whole state” in “the hands of one body of men.”
Rush argued that this grant of power to a single instrument of government violated the
separation of powers. He quoted a passage from the Viscount Bolingbroke in which the
English noble posited that “simple governments,” which granted the “whole supreme
power” solely in the hands of a single individual or group, as governments of “arbitrary
will.”70
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Expounding on this theme, Rush argued that the constitution’s supporters had confused
simplicity of principles— “perfect security for property; liberty and life” with simplicity
of practice. He noted that the essential aims of government were simple, but that their
realization required “extensive combinations” of power. Emphasizing the importance of
an elaborate diffusion of power, Rush contended that simple governments tended towards
tyranny because they failed to properly disperse power.71
Rush distinguished between the principles and forms of government, describing
principles as “simple” and forms as “difficult and complicated.” Illustrating the
difference between principles and practice, he pointed to an example from the scientific
realm: “Who understood the principles of mechanics and optics better than Sir Isaac
Newton? and yet Sir Isaac could not for his life have made a watch or a microscope.”
Rush highlighted the discrepancy between an understanding of the principles of
government and an understanding of those principles’ implications for governmental
structure. He identified John Locke as the “oracle” with regard to principles of
government and James Harrington and the Baron de Montesquieu as oracles with regard
to forms of government. Rush argued that the principles of securing life, liberty, and
property required a level of governmental sophistication that could only be achieved
through the extensive separation of powers advocated by Harrington and Montesquieu.72
Rush questioned the representative character of the state Assembly. Drawing on
the republican notion that the representation of property was foundational to a truly
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representative government, Rush contended that the absence of a property qualification to
vote, combined with the eligibility of all electors to serve in the Assembly, made it
possible for the legislature to have no interest in representing the property-holding
citizens of the state. He envisioned a scenario in which the legislature did not possess “a
single foot of property in the State, and who can give no other evidence of a common
interest in, or attachment to, the community than having paid ‘public taxes,’ which may
mean poor-taxes.” Rush argued that the broad scope of the electorate, coupled with the
absence of any substantive qualifications for officeholding, made it possible for those
who did not possess the levels of property generally thought necessary for political
participation to acquire the reins of power and effectively disenfranchise the propertyholding class.73
Rush simultaneously argued on behalf of basic political equality and organic
social inequality. Responding to the idea that “there is but one rank of men in America,”
Rush conceded that “there should be only one representation of them in a government.”
He further stated his opposition to “artificial distinctions of men into noblemen and
commoners.” However, he argued that, despite the absence of a formal aristocracy, a
more organic social hierarchy had arisen in America. “Superior degrees of industry and
capacity, and above all, commerce” had produced “inequality of property,” creating
“natural distinctions of rank in Pennsylvania, as certain and general as the artificial
distinctions of men in Europe.” Rush argued that these social distinctions predicated on
differences of wealth needed to be represented in a bicameral legislature. Placing the
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middling and poor in the same legislative chamber as the men of “over-grown property”
would merely enable those wealthy members to bribe and control the less wealthy
members. In his concern with maintaining a representation of property within the
legislature and with preventing the natural aristocracy from using influence and bribes to
control their social and economic inferiors, Rush was typically republican.74
Further objecting to the arguments fielded by the constitution’s supporters on
behalf of the document, Rush contended that a traditional separation of powers did not
pave the road for an aristocracy or monarchy to emerge. Contesting the notion that a
“legislative council or governor lays the foundation for aristocratical and monarchical
power in a community,” Rush argued that the popular sanction underpinning upper
houses and governorships would prevent them from becoming tyrannical. Because those
institutions would be popularly elected, they would represent the will of the people.
There was nothing inherently aristocratic about an upper chamber or monarchical about a
governor. He questioned whether “the same fountain of pure water should send forth, at
the same time, wholesome and deadly streams?” and noted that, in a bicameral system,
the “Council and Assembly” were “both formed alike from the common breath of the
people.” Rush went to great lengths to distinguish between balanced government, which
he saw as compatible with the authority of the people, and a mixed regime grounded in a
classical understanding of society.75
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Rush acknowledged popular sovereignty, but his attitude towards its realization
differed greatly from his opponents’ stance. Rush recognized that power was derived
from the people but denied that it should be “seated in the people.” He emphasized the
necessity of a delegation of authority away from the “people at large,” because making
them “judges of laws, or checks for Assemblies” was an effort that relied on the
“supposition that mankind is all alike wise, and just, and have equal leisure.” According
to Rush, the people could not simultaneously delegate power while reserving the right to
exercise it themselves:
What man ever made himself his own attorney? And yet this would not be more
absurd than for the people at large to pretend to give up their power to a set of
rulers, and afterwards reserve the right of making and judging of all their laws
themselves. Such a government is a Monster in nature. It contains as many
Governors, Assemblymen, Judges and Magistrates as there are freemen in the
State, all exercising the same powers and at the same time.76

Rush believed that granting the people an excess of oversight and power over their
representatives was certain to result in disorder. Such a concession failed to recognize the
distinction between the source of power (the people) and their agents, who alone
possessed the authority to exercise it. The people did not even need to choose every
member of a government for it to represent their interests, he argued. Popular sovereignty
took effect even when one representative of the people chose another in their stead. The
people ultimately possessed control by acting as “the first link of the sacred chain of the
power of the State,” but they did not need to control every aspect of that power’s
employment. Rush thought that the practical realities of governance necessitated a
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deference of the people towards their representatives that precluded governments of such
a direct character as the one established by the Pennsylvania framers.77
Essayists also disagreed about the proper scope and composition of the electorate.
“Camillus” rejected the notion that political authority should be removed from the hands
of the people, arguing that “The more simple, and the more immediately dependant the
authority is on the people, the better,” because the people “themselves are the best
guardians of their own liberties.” This direct authority of the people extended to its power
over the legislature, according to “Camillus.” The essayists argued that negatives on
legislative power should only be exercised by the people and their direct agents and that
the exercise of such a check by non-elective elements of the government was a violation
of the sovereignty of the governed. This understanding of popular sovereignty’s
implications for government aligned closely with the powerful and preeminent legislature
established under the state constitution.78
While discussions of the scope of the electorate often took on a theoretical tone, they
were not devoid of social dimensions. “Spectator,” commenting on the Republican
meeting at the Pennsylvania Philosophical Society, praised the attendees as “men of
property, and some of ambition enough to serve all the good people on this side of the
Blue Mountains; and that was much better than to have been plagued with a
contradictious mob of your scum of the earth, who of late conceit they have a right to
meddle with state affairs.” The author noted the conspicuous presence of “leading men”
among the meeting’s members. The author’s open discussion of the existence of a class
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of leading figures better suited to rule than their inferiors among the rabble was
uncharacteristic of Republican rhetoric. Most critics of the constitution criticized the
ability of the people to directly govern themselves and pointed to the magnetic effect
institutions like an upper house and governorship would have on those best suited to
govern. Few expressed the direct hostility towards the masses displayed by “Spectator.”
However, the authors’ bromide against the masses indicated that at least some opposition
to the constitution was motivated by a belief in a distinct social hierarchy.79
II.

Establishing Patriot Credentials

Participants in the press debate also attempted to establish their respective status
as supporters of the Patriot cause, in the process suggesting that their opponents were in
fact either opposed to the cause of independence or, nearly as bad, “disaffected” towards
it.80 They employed a brand of rhetoric laden with appeals to patriotism and bromides
against the British Empire. Appealing to a sense of mutual honor and fortitude, they
portrayed themselves as the foot soldiers of liberty and their opponents as its enemies.81
“Cassius” criticized some of the critics of the constitution for urging NonAssociators and Loyalists to refuse paying a tax imposed on them as a substitute for
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military service, arguing that their advocacy for such a refusal was impeding the war
cause. The essayist characterized the members of the constitutional convention as “Whigs
and Associators” whose works “testif[ied]” of their commitment to the war. By contrast,
those who proposed resistance to the tax for those not engaged in military service were
“Non-Associators.”82
“Scavola” questioned whether the constitution was capable of commanding
enough public support to sustain the state through the course of the war with Britain. The
author predicted that “The next seven years will be loud in their demands upon us for
blood and treasure. They will require uncommon vigor and union among us…”
“Scavola” expressed skepticism as to whether the constitution was capable of producing
such a sense of unanimity and making the people “united and rendered one mass of
people.” Attempting to disentangle support from the Pennsylvania war effort with assent
to the constitution, “Scavola” proposed replacing the constitution’s loyalty oath for
entering public servants with a pledge to disavow allegiance to George III and uphold the
“Freedom and Independence of this state.” Affirming his status as a participant in the
military effort, “Scavola” noted that he had “borne arms in defence of the independence
of these States,” and was “willing to seal his attachment to it with his blood.”83
A gathering of Republicans at the Philadelphia Philosophical Society in
November expressed their belief that a state of disorder was preferable to the
establishment of a government they perceived as inimical to the goals of the Revolution.
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While they recognized the “inconveniences of the want of a regular government, that
shall collect and exert the strength of the state against our powerful external and artful
internal enemies,” they believed that such an absence of a vigorous government was
preferable to the constitution. They argued that the document “destroys the great objects
of equal liberty and free government, for which alone we consented to draw the sword in
the present contest with Great Britain.” Although they believed that a government
capable of superintending the military contest with Britain was essential, they contended
that the state constitution undermined the objectives of the War for Independence to such
an extent that it could not be maintained if the struggle was to retain its character as an
attempt to secure “equal liberty and free government.”84
“Farmer” criticized the internal discord he saw prevailing within the Whig cause.
He noted that the supporters of independence were contending both with the power of the
British Empire and the “political machinations of its [the Revolution’s] internal enemies,
who are endeavouring at this important crisis to throw everything into confusion, by
impeding and distracting our civil polity.” The author did not directly implicate the
constitution’s authors as the Revolution’s “internal enemies,” but expressed criticism of
the constitution’s disruptions of the established order and seemed to view
Constitutionalists as a source of acrimony. However, “Farmer” believed that both Whigs
and Tories were resorting to extreme measures on behalf of their causes: “Where the
Whigs have prevailed, they have run into extravagant refinements, on republican
principles; and where the Tories have prevailed, the spirit of monarchy has made large
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and dangerous strides…” The author believed that neither extreme was “fitted to the
genius and authority of the people.” “Farmer” ultimately inclined towards the Republican
camp while employing a rhetoric of moderation and conciliation.85
“Demophilus” likened those who opposed the state constitution with the initial
opponents of the Patriot cause during the Imperial Crisis. The author contrasted those
individuals’ desire to maintain order and stability under British rule, to “submit to some
abridgement of liberty rather than run the venture of being thrown into a state of anarchy
and confusion” with their sudden commitment to “overthrowing our civil constitution
without proposing one single measure for establishing another.” “Demophilus” suggested
that those individuals had in fact retained their support for Britain and that it was this
covert loyalism which motivated their opposition to the constitution. By challenging the
“authority of whole community,” and conspiring to alter the constitution, these
individuals leaned towards an “immediate separation of themselves from the body of the
Common-Wealth.” “Demophilus” noted that, surprisingly, “in fact some of the are open
enough to acknowledge the consequence” of this separation taunted their fellow
Pennsylvanians with prospect of occupation by the British, “tell[ing] us plainly as they
think will bear, that Lord Howe is expected to pay us a visit in Philadelphia.” In
Demophilus’s account, there was only a short distance between attempting to change the
constitution and supporting the British war effort.86
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“Union” believed that both the constitution’s supporters and opponents were
genuinely invested in the success of the War of Independence but argued that revising the
constitution was an essential precondition for winning the conflict. The author
characterized the constitution’s authors as “worthy men and warmly attached to the
American cause,” who “had nothing in view but the liberty and happiness of
Pennsylvania.”87 However, “Union” believed that the constitution’s authors had failed to
establish a government capable of securing liberty and ensuring happiness. The essayist
argued that an immediate reshaping of the constitution was necessary. In response to
those who argued that the “immediate establishment of a regular government” was
imperative, “Union” questioned: “Is there anything half the consequence in the present
struggle as a good constitution?” Expanding on that question, the author argued that the
source and objective of the military conflict was the desire for “a good government.”88
“Union” argued that abandoning the constitution was the state’s best hope of
animating the energies of Pennsylvania’s soldiers: “And what but a good government will
ever call forth the wisdom—the strength and the virtue of Pennsylvania, so as to give
them their proper weight in the great scale of the United States?” “Union” characterized a
good government as “a soldier’s legal title to liberty,” noting that “The prospect of
ending his days under a happy constitution is the sweetest supporter a soldier can have
under the hardships of a campaign.” This incentive made amending the constitution an
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ideal way to “call forth the flower of our State, and fill our camp with men, who will
possess with the courage of soldiers, the disinterested virtues of citizens and patriots.”89
“Hampden” similarly contended that the demands of wartime and the presence of
“Howe at our gates” were not sufficiently compelling reasons to maintain the
constitution. The essayist queried, “Did we say a ‘bad government was better than none’
when we threw off the royal and proprietary governments of Great-Britain? Did we not
feel ourselves too much cramped by them, to exert our whole strength in the defence of
our liberties?” While the author recognized the tumultuous circumstances facing
Pennsylvania, they noted that the other states had framed their constitutions in the midst
of warfare. Further, they contended that continuing under the state constitution much
longer would render Pennsylvanians “ever afterwards unfit to assert or relish the sweets
of liberty, or of a free government.”90
“Addison” addressed the military campaign of 1776, arguing that Pennsylvanians’
valor “reflect[ed] much honour upon the state, but none upon the Constitution.” The
essayist suggested that the constitution had not been the source of the military heroism
displayed by Pennsylvania’s soldiers: “Did it prompt them to face all the dangers of the
war, and to endure all the inclemencies of the season? Did it lead them against the enemy
at Princeton? Did it support them under the amazing fatigues, which preceded and
followed the action at that place?” “Addison” believed that Pennsylvanians had
demonstrated tremendous courage, but that it had not been motivated by any desire to
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sustain the constitution. The essayist suggested that the loyalty oath established by the
constitution was detrimental to the Patriot cause. Rather than being aimed at “tories, or
persons disaffected to the American cause,” the oath was in reality intended to exclude
those within the Patriot camp “who should disapprove of the constitution,” a number
which included “a majority of the Whigs in the state.” While “Addison” believed that
abandoning the constitution in the middle of the conflict with Britain would result in
“confusion and anarchy,” the author contended that it was nonetheless an obstacle to
winning the War for Independence, not an asset.91
A circular published in May of 1777 contended that the constitution had
transformed Pennsylvania from a model Patriot state to an ineffectual participant in the
struggle for independence. At the outset of the conflict with Britain, “Vigour and union
prevailed in her Councils, and in her actions. She was considered as a pattern for other
governments. Her exertions in the general cause were great and important. The enemies
of liberty beheld her with dread, and its friends with pleasure.” However, the constitution
had produced an absence of effective government, evidenced by the Assembly’s
abandonment of the state the previous winter, an absence of laws “adequate to our
present very critical situation,” the spread of disaffection with the Revolutionary cause,
the depreciation of currency, and a shortage of necessities. Although the circular
acknowledged the presence of “Whigs on both sides of this dispute about the
Constitution,” it argued that the constitution was the source of Pennsylvania’s failure to
effectively contribute to the war effort. While the piece recognized the sincere Whiggism
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of the Constitutionalists, it suggested that their faith in the constitution as an embodiment
of Revolutionary principles had been contradicted by its failure to effectively unify the
state’s partisans of the Patriot cause.92
Benjamin Rush voiced a similar opinion of the constitution’s authors, noting their
sincere commitment to the Patriot cause but describing them as completely incapable of
creating an effective government. He identified the members of the constitutional
convention as “true Whigs” who “aimed sincerely at forming a free and happy
government” but remarked that “if [Robert] Filmar (sic) and [Thomas] Hobbes had sat
among them, they could not formed a government more destructive of human happiness.”
Neither, he believed could “Lord North or General Howe” have created a government
“more destructive of union and vigour, in our public affairs.” Rush avoided the common
tendency to characterize the Constitutionalists as Loyalists but concurred with fellow
Republicans in noting that the constitution was scarcely more favorable to the interests of
Pennsylvania than British rule had been.93
An author writing in late 1778 contended that the precedent of the Patriot effort to
secure independence should serve as an indication of the lengths to which Pennsylvanians
should resort in replacing the constitution. Noting that Pennsylvanians’ “support of the
present revolution” had been animated by “indignation” against “an attempt made upon
your liberties by the people of Great Britain,” the author questioned what measures might
be necessary to replace a “constitution inconsistent with the principles of liberty.” The
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essayist questioned the commitment of Constitutionalists to the Patriot cause, noting the
presence of “persons who have assumed the title of Whigs; and, by bawling against
Tories, have imposed themselves upon us as sound patriots.” In contrast to these pretend
Patriots, Republicans were “men who have spiritedly, from the beginning, opposed the
tyranny of Great Britain.” The author identified “the purpose of the revolution” as
“establish[ing] and secur[ing] the liberties of America” and suggested that the
constitution had fundamentally betrayed those objectives.94
The prospect of winning the war also influenced direct political appeals. When six
representatives in the state Assembly from Bedford County refused to take their seats in
the legislature out of opposition to the constitution, some of their constituents appealed to
the pressing need to direct all the state’s energies towards the military conflict. They
argued that the prosecution of the war should take precedent over internal debates about
the constitution and rather poetically raised the charge to combat: “Come, brave boys, let
us hasten to the field, and contend for our liberties with the sword, and lay aside all
fruitless disputes, lest a yoke be forced upon our necks, bigger than our father’s loins.”95
Although the concurrent claims to Patriot legitimacy and accusations of Toryism
made by Constitutionalists and Republicans rarely explicitly addressed the content of the
constitution, they were nonetheless steeped in clashing understandings of its effect on the
conduct of the war in Pennsylvania. The constitution’s supporters contended that it had
successfully guided the state through the travails of conflict, serving as a source of
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martial unity. Its critics argued that the state’s soldiers were fighting to overthrow British
control over the state and that they were not at all motivated by a desire to preserve the
constitution. The essayists on both sides seemed to make little distinction between the
Revolution as a political process and the conduct of the war itself—suggesting by
implication that, because the constitution was either an asset or an obstruction to the
prosecution of the conflict, it was either an essential part of the Revolutionary struggle or
an obstacle to its fulfillment.
III.

Continuity vs. Change

The extent to which the Frame of Government differed from the proprietary
government in place throughout Pennsylvania’s colonial history was another source of
contention among those who engaged in newspaper debates over the constitution. Critics
of the constitution argued that the document’s authors had gone to extreme lengths in
their efforts to upend the proprietary system and had produced a form of government
inconsistent with the state’s conventions. While they advocated for a replacement of the
monarchical and hereditary characteristics of the proprietary system with republican and
elective ones, they argued that the basic structure of the government already in place
should have been retained. The wholesale abandonment of the proprietary system
revealed an inattentiveness to the “prejudices and habits of the people.”96 “Scavola”
expressed a conviction that the constitution conflicted with the “genius, manners, habits,
and prejudices of the people of Pennsylvania.”97 The attendees of an anticonstitutionalist
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gathering in the statehouse yard in Philadelphia summed up this view by noting that the
constitution “unnecessarily deviates from all resemblance to the former government of
this state, to which the people have become accustomed” and observing that the people
only wanted an abolition of the “kingly, parliamentary, and proprietary powers.”98
A subsequent Republican gathering issued a similar criticism, arguing that the
constitution’s authors had failed to account for the state’s governing traditions. Urging a
group of incoming legislators to propose amendments to the constitution, they stressed
the representatives’ responsibility to account for “influence of ancient habits upon the
minds of your constituents,” and to thus “oppose unnecessary alterations in the late form
of government of Pennsylvania.” They contended that the basic structure of the
proprietary government needed to be retained and that the only “innovations” that were
necessary were those that “abolish the late regal and proprietary power of the state” and
“place the whole executive power of the government in the hands of the servants of the
people.” They wanted the government of Pennsylvania to be cleansed of the vestiges of
monarchical and proprietary rule and become representative but argued that further
deviations from colonial tradition were unnecessary. This suggested that they viewed the
act of constitution-making not as a transformative and decisive abandonment of prior
precedent, but as an opportunity to retain the basic elements of existing government
practice while rejecting those which were unrepublican.99
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“Christophilus Scotus” acknowledged that the circumstances surrounding the
constitution’s framing had been “extraordinary” and that “extraordinary diseases require
extraordinary remedies.” Despite this recognition of the extreme situation in which the
convention’s members had found themselves, however, the essayist expressed
befuddlement at their departure from the colonial charter. The author questioned “why
the Convention, in their new frame of government, should have steered so wide of the
good old charter and constitution of this formerly happy and flourishing province.” While
the authors of the constitution were justified in considering radical measures, prosperity
and happiness had prevailed under the proprietorship and “Christophilus Scotus” could
see no reason why such a beneficial frame of government should be abandoned.100
“Ludlow” believed that the constitution had failed to properly account for the
“ancient habits & customs of the people of Pennsylvania.” This was a tremendous error,
the author contended, because “The suddenness of the late revolution, the attachment of a
large body of the people to the old Constitution of the state, and the general principles of
human nature” all made “an attention to ancient forms and habits…a matter of utmost
importance.” The essayist believed that maintaining governmental continuity was
essential in a crisis as sweeping as the military struggle with Britain.101
“A Friend of Mankind” extolled Pennsylvania’s status as a beacon of progress and
attributed this success to the proprietorship. In addition to pointing out the proprietary
government’s success in securing persons, property, and liberties, the author argued that
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it had been essential to Pennsylvania’s rapid development into a haven of law, reason,
and civilization. Pennsylvania had undergone in under a century an “astonishing progress
not only in wealth, trade and manufactories, but in the polite arts and sciences.” The
essayist could find no other example in which “a wilderness as this country was within
the past century, aided by all the powers of the parent state, had made an equal progress
with this of Pennsylvania, founded solely on the reason, equity, and mildness of its laws.”
“A Friend of Mankind” stressed the exceptionalism of Pennsylvania and suggested that
its societal and governmental distinctness would be eroded through the abandonment of
the proprietorship.102
This aspect of the Republican critiques revealed two things. First, it indicated a
preference for custom and convention—perhaps unsurprising, considering the extent to
which those principles were generally regarded as foundational to Anglo-American
constitutionalism. Secondly, and more interestingly, it suggested the notion that
governmental structures and governmental forms were not interchangeable. Republicans
argued that a concurrent retention of the proprietary frame of government and
displacement of “kingly, parliamentary, and proprietary powers,” could be achieved. This
indicated a notion that governmental structures were not inherently conducive to either
popular or monarchical rule. This set them apart from Constitutionalists, who believed
that institutions of government could be conformed precisely to the interests of the people
and that the failure to create a system of government that replicated directly the interests
of the people would jeopardize the Revolution. Republicans believed that constitutional
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innovation was not necessary to secure the Revolution because the Revolution was
primarily a struggle for local autonomy from British control. For them, it was not an
effort to establish a government that embodied a direct vision of popular government that
required a decisive abandonment of previous constitutional precedents. Even in debating
something as simple as the preservation of established customs of governing, the the
ideological chasm between Constitutionalists and Republicans was glaring.
IV.

Conclusion

The debate that emerged in the aftermath of the constitution’s adoption
encompassed a broad range of issues. Through their assertions about the proper
composition and authority of the legislature, the scope of the electorate (a question which
entailed consideration of the relationship between the government and the governed), and
the constitution’s place in the struggle for independence, Constitutionalists and
Republicans expressed distinct visions of society, government, and the American
Revolution. Their understandings of the constitution, and consequently of the course of
the Revolution in Pennsylvania, were shaped by convictions about the nature of politics
which apparently predated the constitution’s creation. While the constitution provided the
occasion for these understandings to be expressed, the conflict between the participants’
political visions was rooted in fundamentally different conceptions of politics that
preceded the document’s drafting. These political visions informed the ways in which
Constitutionalists and Republicans viewed the constitution’s Frame of Government. In
the domestic conflict within the Patriot movement in Pennsylvania, politics shaped
constitutionalism. Constitutionalism in turn became intertwined with the ways in which
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the differing Whig factions viewed the Revolution itself. These developments remained
essential, if less apparent than they were at the military conflict’s outset, throughout the
course of the war, and manifested themselves quite visibly during the Council of
Censors’ deliberations in 1783 and 1784.
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Chapter Three: Debates on the Pennsylvania Constitution in the Council of
Censors, 1783-84

When the Council of Censors convened in 1783, it wielded a broad mandate to
review the Pennsylvania constitution. It was constitutionally empowered to review and
strike down enactments by the state legislature, giving it a retroactive negative on the
Assembly. It was also authorized to propose amendments to the constitution. The latter
power made the Council’s meetings, held both in late 1783 and the summer of 1784, an
ideal forum for adjudicating the opposing stances on the document assumed by the
constitution’s supporters and opponents. Republican critics of the constitution, intent on
reshaping the constitution to make it more closely resemble conventional notions about
the division of powers, made a number of proposals to amend the document.
Constitutionalist supporters of the Frame of Government countered by associating the
constitution with the spirit and character of the Revolution. Assuming the constitution’s
alignment with Whig principles, they accused their adversaries of engaging in a
campaign to overturn the achievements of the Patriot cause.
These accusations were undoubtedly inspired in part by the expediency of
accusing the opposition of Loyalism. However, they also revealed a broader aspect of the
constitutional debate. Both Constitutionalists and Republicans believed that their
respective constitutional visions were inextricably tied to the character and fate of the
Revolution. Constitutionalists thought that the constitution’s extensive institutionalization
of the doctrine of popular sovereignty made it an ideal model of republican government.
Republicans in turn argued that the document made excessive concessions to the people
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and set the Commonwealth on the path to legislative tyranny. Adherents of both positions
believed that proper constitutional structure was essential to securing the Revolution.
The Council of Censors was the product of a unique provision in the state’s Frame
of Government. The constitution provided for a septennial gathering consisting of two
members from each city and county. This body was charged with both ensuring that the
constitution had been “preserved inviolate in every part” and determining “whether the
legislative and executive branches of government have performed their duty as guardians
of the people, or assumed to themselves, or exercised other or greater powers than they
are entitled to by the constitution.” It was authorized to send for “persons, papers, and
records,” publicly censure individuals, order impeachments, and recommend the repeal of
laws passed in violation of the constitution. The Censors were further given the power to
amend the constitution “within two years after their sitting,” to alter laws they regarded
as “defective,” to clarify ambiguous laws, and to introduce new laws deemed “necessary
for the preservation of the rights and happiness of the people.”103 The Council’s essential
purpose was to ensure the “recurrence to fundamental principles” deemed necessary by
the constitution’s Declaration of Rights.104
Of all the powers it possessed, the Council of Censors’ authority to amend the
constitution was the source of the most attention. Indeed, the prospect of amending the
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constitution was the subject of enormous debate within the convention. Those dissatisfied
with the contents of the Frame of Government established in 1776 and with the nature of
the state’s politics in subsequent years proposed a series of changes intended to make the
state government more balanced. These included the replacement of the Executive
Council with a governor possessing the authority to veto bills and appoint officials, the
creation of an upper house of the state legislature, and the creation of fixed salaries and
life terms (contingent on “good behaviour”) for members of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.105 These measures would have reshaped the government of Pennsylvania along
lines similar to those established by most of the other state constitutions adopted at the
beginning of the American Revolution.106
The Constitutionalist members of the convention decried these proposals,
claiming that they would remold the Senate in the image of an “aristocratic nobility” and
throttle the popular will in favor of the interests of the “wealthy and great.”107 While the
debates over these proposals did not produce any changes to the constitution, they did
reveal the extent to which its critics and supporters diverged on fundamental questions of
constitutional philosophy. Constitutionalists were committed to preserving the state’s

105

The proceedings relative to calling the conventions of 1776 and 1790: the minutes of the convention that
formed the present constitution of Pennsylvania: together with the charter to William Penn, the
constitutions of 1776 and 1790, and a view of the proceedings of 1776, and the council of censors
(Harrisburg, PA: John Wiestling, 1825), 72; 74-76. Hereafter cited as Proceedings.
106
On the state constitutions of the Revolutionary period, see Wood, Creation, Willi Paul Adams, The First
American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the
Revolutionary Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979); Donald S. Lutz, Popular
Consent and Popular Control: Whig Political Theory in the Early State Constitutions (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1980); Marc Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty: State Constitution
Making in Revolutionary America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).
107
Jackson Turner Main, The Antifederalists: Critics of the Constitution, 1781-1788 (New York: Norton,
1961), 42.

56

ongoing experiment in exalting the popular will as the prime directive in government,
while Republicans were determined to craft a system of government similar to those of
the other states. Both parties recognized popular sovereignty. They differed, however, on
the extent to which they though it should be institutionalized. Constitutionalists wished to
see it unfettered, while Republicans wished to constrain it within clearly prescribed
bounds.
Tensions within the convention of Censors hinged on questions concerning the
proper bounds of legislative authority. The revisionist element, comprised principally of
Republicans who had from the outset opposed the state constitution, charged that the state
legislature had completely abused its authority under the document and in the process
reduced the supreme executive council and state supreme court to phantoms. They
pointed to these actions as evidence of fundamental flaws in the constitution, contending
that it had failed to impose the restraints on legislative power necessary to prevent the
Assembly from becoming tyrannical.108 Constitutionalists argued that the constitution had
created a proper distribution of powers. While they recognized that the legislature had on
occasion violated the constitution, they believed that these incidences were not evidence
of essential defects in the constitution, but simply isolated examples of the abuse of
power.109
The debates that occurred between Republican and Constitutionalist members of the
Council revealed an enormous rift in constitutional ideology. Republicans emphasized

108
109

Proceedings, 86-7.
Ibid., 90.

57

the importance of a tightly regulated balance of powers between the branches of
government, arguing that it was the cornerstone of a viable political order.
Constitutionalists, by contrast, esteemed the unrestrained expression of popular
sovereignty as the foundation of good government. They viewed the introduction of
amendments to the constitution intended to establish a clearly delineated balance of
power as an impediment to popular government. They believed that the constitution had
established a government genuinely accountable to and controllable by its constituents,
and that the creation of a conventional balance of powers would undermine, if not
outright obliterate, this state of affairs.
I.

Debates in the Council’s First Session

In the Council of Censors’ first meeting, the constitution’s critics wielded a narrow
[13-12] majority. While they did not possess the two-thirds majority necessary to call for
a convention to amend the constitution, they hoped to publicize their criticisms of the
document and thereby generate enough popular pressure on their Constitutionalist
counterparts to force a convention.110
From their slight majority vantage, Republicans issued a systematic critique of the
distribution of power created in 1776. They argued that the unicameral nature of the state
legislature was dangerous because it afforded factions with the opportunity to arise to
dominance. Perhaps more tellingly, they submitted that the legislature’s single-chamber
design offered opportunities for the body to “usurp” “legislative and judicial authority” --
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a prospect against which the people would have no recourse except revolution.111 To
remedy these problems, they proposed a familiar solution: the creation of a bicameral
legislature consisting of an upper house and a lower house. This was by no means an
innovative solution. Bicameralism was a staple of Anglo-American political thought,
expressed most notably in John Adams’s Thoughts on Government.112 Arguing that the
state constitution was riddled with fatal defects, Republicans had a conventional remedy
in mind.
In addition to criticizing the preeminence of the legislature, the constitution’s critics
also contended that the plenary design of the Executive Council made it a poor vehicle
for decision-making. Rather than creating a Governorship, the constitution vested
executive power in a nominal, mostly ineffectual, President and a twelve-person Supreme
Executive Council.113 The revisionists saw the lack of a figurehead in instances of
executive mistakes as a problem. They believed it was necessary to have someone in a
position of accountability should the executive branch misbehave. The critical Censors
also thought that a council was more dangerous to the Commonwealth than a governor
would be, arguing that groups of men might be persuaded to engage in collective
blunders they might not commit if left to their individual judgment.114
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They further quibbled with the method of elections for the Executive Council’s
President. The constitution provided for his election by the council’s members and the
members of the general assembly. The Republican contingent of Censors argued that this
mode of selection was dangerous because a President wielding a popular mandate might
operate in ways detrimental to the good of the Commonwealth.115 The perennial fear of a
demagogue taking advantage of popular support and becoming a tyrant seems to have
animated this concern. However, in an apparent contradiction of the logic underpinning
their concern, the revisionists proposed popular election to the Governorship.116
Republicans proposed the creation of a governor’s position to streamline the decisionmaking process and aggregate responsibility in the person of a single figurehead.117 They
advocated granting the Governor a robust array of powers. The most important
stipulation among these was that the governor possess a veto and thus wield a negative
against any undesirable laws passed by the general assembly.118
The constitution’s opponents expressed concerns about the executive branch that
indicated they were not simply worried about the general assembly’s exercise of
excessive power. Their abiding preoccupation with checking power and preventing
tyranny from arising evidenced itself in their concern with restraining every branch of
government. While the Republican members of the session were determined to expand
the powers of the executive, they were not motivated by an overriding intention to
establish it as the supreme branch, as their adversaries alleged. Rather, they were
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committed to achieving a more conventional balance of power in the state government
than existed under the 1776 constitution.
The proponents of the constitutional status quo responded to these criticisms by first
stating their belief in the “essential principle” that constitutions should not be “lightly
changed,” and by noting the roadblocks to changes in “fundamental principles”
established by the constitution. They observed the constitution’s requirement of a 2/3
majority in the Censors for the calling of a convention to amend the document--noting by
implication, it seemed, that “faults of so alarming a tendency” as to generate
overwhelming demand for reform had not become apparent. They praised the stability
this provision had provided and warned of the “continual fluctuations” in which its
abandonment would result.119
Constitutionalists further defended the constitution by appealing to the spirit of
patriotic unanimity that had, they submitted, animated its framing and adoption. They
painted a portrait of consensus and general devotion to the principles of the Patriot cause.
The constitution had been adopted “with great harmony” at a time “when the flame of
liberty shone brightest.” The people of the state had been “impressed with no other idea
than that of acquiring and maintaining to themselves and their posterity, equal liberty.”
The Constitutionalist members of the Council contrasted the unity and cohesion that
existed at the time of the constitution’s adoption with the subsequent emergence of
“factions” harboring “ambitious or mercenary motives.” They disregarded the rancor and
contention that pervaded the post-convention debates of 1776. In their narrative of the
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constitution’s reception, the document had enjoyed an uncontested adoption. It had
subsequently proven its merit by securing the state’s “safety and happiness” against the
assaults of both “a most formidable enemy without,” [the British] and “a most
indefatigable and insidious party within [Republicans]. ”120
The Constitutionalist members of the Council were equating the critics of the
constitution with the British--an extreme comparison which attested to their intense
reverence for the document. To them, it seemed a direct product of the harmony,
patriotism, and principles that set the Revolution in motion. In their eyes, the state
constitution had encapsulated the “flame of liberty” and ensured its defense by
establishing a sturdy governmental foundation capable of withstanding the exigencies of
the war. By seeking to introduce significant changes to the constitution, the reformist
element of the state’s political scene was engaged in a campaign to reverse the course of
Independence and undermine the Revolutionary legacy. For Constitutionalists, the
constitution was an embodiment of the Patriot cause, and any effort to substantively
reshape it was an effort to undermine the accomplishments of the American Revolution
in Pennsylvania. The constitution’s opponents were thus not working merely to amend
Pennsylvania’s Frame of Government, but to abandon the American Revolution. Their
campaign to uncover “faults and imperfections” was merely an “excuse” to dislodge a
document that had “withstood the most arduous trial.” Further questioning the character
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of the Republicans, Constitutionalists raised doubts about the “purity” of residents of
“some parts of the state.”121
The Constitutionalist counter against the Republican reform effort was steeped in
rhetoric similar to that employed by the English Country school and revealed a profound
immersion in the Whig paradigm.122 Constitutionalists appealed to the Whig
apprehension about the dangers of government by elite interests, contending that the
changes proposed by Republicans would produce a decidedly aristocratic frame of
government. Referring to Republicans’ proposals for the creation of a bicameral
legislature, Constitutionalists warned against the creation of “aristocratic ranks” among
the citizenry. The dubbed the proposed governorship a “chief magistrate” and argued that
his proposed scope of authority surpassed “those of the ordinary lot of kings.” They
appealed to the people’s “love” for “equal liberty” and abhorrence toward “all attempts to
lift one class of citizens above the heads of the rest, and much more the elevating any one
citizen to the throne of royalty.” For Constitutionalists, the constitution’s genius and
value derived from its simplicity: it assumed a homogeneous society, in which social rank
and economic interests were not directly reflected in the structure of government.123
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Republicans countered by presenting an account of the circumstances surrounding
the constitution’s creation entirely different from the narrative cast by their opponents.
They argued that the constitution was established under incredibly precarious
circumstances: the “passions of the state” were “unusually agitated” in the midst of
hostilities with Britain. Several “wise and able men” were absent from the state due either
to obligations in the Continental Congress or the Continental Army. Under such
unusually pressing circumstances, they asked “whether it was reasonable to expect that a
constitution could be formed proper for a great and growing state?” Challenging the
picture of constitutional consensus depicted by their opponents, they noted that there was
significant opposition to the constitution’s adoption and that many had acceded to the
document only under the assumption that it would be amended once the Council of
Censors convened.124
The Republican Censors appealed to the deliberative nature of the Council of
Censors and the relatively peaceful circumstances that now existed in the state as reasons
for amending the constitution. The “passions and prejudices” they saw as the source of
the state constitution could be overturned in favor of “cool deliberation,”; indeed, “the
intricate science of government” demanded it. Alluding to their status as the elite
stewards of the state, they noted that “few have had either leisure or opportunities to turn
their thoughts” towards the subject of government. Expressing an unabashedly deferential
conception of politics, they suggested that those who had the leisure and opportunities
necessary to consider matters of government should be placed at the forefront of affairs
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of state. The people at large--or at least the relative political newcomers who had been
present at the constitutional convention in the summer of 1776--were not, in their
evaluation, as qualified to engage in the process of forming a government as their
superiors.125 At the time of the constitution’s adoption, the state’s “political knowledge
was in its infancy.” It had now matured and was sufficient to correct the deficiencies of
the constitution.126
The revisionists further challenged the Constitutionalists’ assertions about the
constitution’s success in guiding the Commonwealth through the war. They denied that
the constitution was the source of the state’s successes against Britain. Rather, “all the
exertions of Pennsylvania,” were attributable to the “virtue of the people.” This virtue,
not the constitution, had enabled Pennsylvanians to withstand the travails of wartime. If
anything, the constitution had been a burden on the people and an obstacle to their
successes in the war. Unlike Constitutionalists, Republicans did not identify the cause of
the Revolution with the constitution. Nor did they think the constitution a suitable
mechanism for realizing its fulfillment. They believed that the principles of the
Revolution were carried by the people, not inscribed in the constitution. The people, and
the people alone, had the potential to achieve independence and secure liberty.127
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II.

Making the Debate Public: The Pamphlet War

Republicans took to the press to support their claims about the Constitution,
publishing a number of pamphlets to present their views to the public. They succinctly
presented the essence of their case against the document in An Address of the Council of
Censors to the Freemen of Pennsylvania and presented a systematic exposition of their
positions on the Constitution in A Candid Examination of the Address of the Minority of
Council of Censors to the People of Pennsylvania. While the arguments presented in
those pamphlets largely resembled those issued in the course of the Council’s
proceedings, they provide an enhanced understanding of the nature of Republicans’
grievances.
An Address acknowledged the Republicans’ fixation on the constitution,
recognizing its amendment as “the most weighty matter” addressed within the Council.
Apparently intending to highlight its differences from the other state constitutions, the
Republicans remarked that the Council had “compared it with the constitutions of the
other states.” They emphasized that their proposed amendments to the constitution would
bring the Frame of Government into alignment with the governmental structures
established under other state constitutions, noting that their proposals were “not
experiments,” but were “founded on the reason and the experience of our sister states.” In
their appeal to the people, the Republicans were explicit about their intention to create a
state government that adhered to the conventional wisdoms about government
represented in most of the other state constitutions.128
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They also asserted their Patriot credentials. They denied the notion that their
interests in any way differed from those of their constituents. Rather, they presented their
motives as grounded in a vigor for the Whig cause. Their “political principles,” were
proven, they argued, by their place as “the consistent opposers of our British foes.” This
status as ardent Patriots was confirmed by the fact that “most of us have risqued our lives
and fortunes during the whole of the contest.” In a state where Loyalist sentiment was
seemingly strong, and a large segment of the population was accused of supporting the
British cause by refusing to take part in the war effort, Republicans were trying to
demonstrate that their brand of constitutionalism was inspired by and consistent with the
military valor they displayed through individual sacrifice and bravery on the
battlefield.129
Where An Address was cursory, A Candid Examination was much more
substantial in scope. The Republican authors essayed a broad range of topics and
provided an exhaustive presentation of their stances on the constitution. In the process of
criticizing the constitution, the authors disclosed a number of their fundamental
assumptions about the nature of power, the relationship between the government and the
governed, and the implications those notions had for governmental structure.
The authors presented perhaps the most compelling explanation of any
Republican apology regarding the need for a strong Executive. They argued that semantic
distinctions “A King, a Governor, [or] a President,” were of little importance. What really
mattered was that such a “Chief Magistrate” be established, because “our nature and the
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social state,” required the existence of an executive element of the government. The
alternative, they contended, was a degeneration of Pennsylvanians into “savages to a state
of society.” While they acknowledged that constraints on executive power were
indispensable, the natural inclinations of humanity towards disorder required that a
counterposing force be applied in the form of a strong and viable executive figure. In the
same passage, however, they asserted that this constraining force needed to itself be
subjected to restraints. They emphasized the importance of a balance of power, stating:
“Power must be delegated; and if that power is not balanced, give your government what
name you please, you will find it but a name, and you are slaves.”130 The authors argued
that because their proposed governorship would be elective, the executive branch would
be more accountable to the people than the Supreme Executive Council in place under the
constitution, while still possessing the energy necessary to counteract the legislative and
judicial branches.131
A Candid Examination also addressed Republicans’ perception that the
constitution had failed to safeguard the state judiciary against political pressures. The
authors argued that the document’s twenty-third section, which made members of the
state supreme court “removable for misbehavior at any time by the general assembly,”
effectively gave the legislature undue leverage over the court’s justices and “annihilates
the liberties of Pennsylvania in a single blow.”132 It made the legislature “at once the
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accusers, the witnesses, and the judges” of the state judiciary.133 Just as they contended
that the executive needed to be free of legislative influence, they argued that the judiciary
should be completely independent from outside pressures. Courts, they argued, “should
be incapable of influence or corruption.” They needed to be not only independent, but
“wholly independent—of the Assembly, of the Council—nay more, of the people.” The
authors warned that “Liberty, property, and life,” were all imperiled when such a degree
of absolute judicial independence was not maintained. They believed that even the
slightest participle of legislative influence compromised the judiciary, which served a
similar purpose to the state as “the powers of conscience” did to the mind.134
Another aspect of the authors’ critique of the constitution was their contention
that the document was in no sense connected to the war effort in Pennsylvania. The
Republican critics assailed the idea that the constitution’s preservation had been the
object of the state’s participants in the military contest with Great Britain. They found the
notion that the constitution had been paid for by “the blood of thousands,” inconceivable.
They questioned the commitment of the constitution’s authors to the Patriot cause, noting
that “The friends to the constitution have indeed assumed the name of whigs,” but that a
number of them “withdrew themselves from the field of danger, immediately” upon the
constitution’s adoption. The genuine supporters of the Revolutionary cause, “Those who
persevered in support of the liberties of America,” were generally opposed to the
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constitution, being “too much enlightened, to shed their blood in support for a system that
was to render them unhappy and their country despicable.”135
The Republican authors equated the system of government established under the
constitution with the “British tyranny” the newly formed United States were fighting to
overthrow. They questioned whether it was possible “that the men who have fought
through the whole course of the war, and submitted to hardships that in age or country an
army ever sustained before, to emancipate you from British tyranny, should be the friends
of that tyranny?” Drawing a connection between Pennsylvania soldiers’ opposition to
Britain and their hostility towards the state constitution, the authors asked, “are they not,
almost to a man, averse to the present constitution?” Not only did the constitution fail to
attain the credence of an embodiment of Revolutionary principles, the authors further
suggested that it was little better than the British policies that had prompted the
Americans’ effort to separate themselves from the empire.136 The authors concurrently
questioned the commitment of the constitution’s authors to the Patriot cause by throwing
doubt on their military service and made it clear that they distinguished between the
cause of the war effort and the maintenance of the constitution.
The authors also stressed the resemblance between their proposed revisions to the
constitution and the governmental structures created under the constitutions established
by the majority of the other states. They noted that “Maryland and Delaware on one side,
and New-Jersey, New-York, Connecticut, Rhode-Island, and New Hampshire, all have
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governments similar to that we have recommended to you.” They pointed to those states’
constitutions as evidence that the governors and upper houses did not necessarily have to
morph into “either a King or a House of Lords.” It was possible, they argued, to establish
“wisdom in their legislatures” and “energy in their executive branches” without
producing a tyrannical regime. By placing their proposals within the mainstream of
American constitutionalism during the Revolution, the Republicans were both endorsing
conventional governmental structures and suggesting that their program was in alignment
with the prevailing wisdom of the time.137
A Candid Examination also presented a decidedly republican account of the
proper scope of the electorate. They argued that the constitution’s failure to require of
voters and officeholders anything greater than a “common interest” with the community
was an insufficiently high threshold for political participation. They presented “This tie,
by means of life” as “the most common of any that men can have to a government,” but
argued that it was “by no means sufficient to entitle a man to dispose of the liberty or
property of his fellow citizens.” By granting direct political authority to every individual,
the constitution had, the Republicans argued, made it possible for those without a
substantial stake in the interests of the commonwealth to abuse their authority and divest
their fellow citizens of their liberty and property.138
The authors identified property as the cornerstone of government. They argued
that “Nine tenths of all laws relate to the disposal of property,” noting that government’s
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origins could be traced to the emergence of the concept of property. They contended that
liberty and life needed fewer legal protections to survive than did property. They argued
that it was “absurd therefore for any man to dispose of his neighbor’s property, who has
no property himself.” A government that facilitated such a state of affairs was inherently
“unequal” and productive of aristocracy or monarchy.139 Appealing to the civic humanist
ideal of the independent freeholder, they posited that “An independent share of property
in an elector is the only thing that can make him independent, or secure the state against
the various species of corruption which prevail at elections.”140
The authors were presenting a vision of society that clashed directly with the
more socially egalitarian vision articulated by Constitutionalists. Constitutionalists
viewed the community as a corporate entity animated by the popular will and not
particularly reliant on individual virtue. They thought that a constitutional order that
upheld the interests of society by heeding the voice of all white men was the best way of
promoting the common good. Republicans differed, arguing that, while the interests of
society were paramount, the individual property-holder was the foundation of society.
Republicans believed that the virtuous individual was the cornerstone of a free society
and that such virtue could only exist under a government that carefully protected
individual rights, especially the right to hold property. This required serious restrictions
on the political power of those who did not hold property and were therefore not virtuous.
On this issue, both factions were living up to their names. Constitutionalists believed that
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a proper constitutional order (which they believed meant a system that promoted societal
interests and the popular will) was the best way of achieving a free society. Republicans
thought that individual virtue was the basis of a free society and that extensive constraints
on the political power of a large segment of the population were necessary to ensure that
government could survive.
Constitutionalist members of the Council of Censors countered the Republican
appeal to the electorate by publishing their own pamphlets intended to generate public
opposition against the reform campaign in which Republicans were engaged. The authors
of To the freemen of Pennsylvania depicted the contest over the constitution as a struggle
between “liberty and slavery”—a dreadful prospect, they argued, in a state “where the
light of science the love of liberty shine with peculiar lustre.” They appealed to concerns
about the transfer of property—although, unlike Republicans, they were unconcerned
about the dangers of the masses using political power to seize the property of elites.
Rather, they expressed apprehension about “the people, and their property, being
delivered into the hands of a set of tyrants,” and argued that such a development was
inevitable if Pennsylvanians ever decided to “suffer the executive to intrench upon the
other branches.”141
While To the freemen of Pennsylvania expressed a general concern about the
dangers of executive power without exploring the ways in which such a threat was facing
Pennsylvania, the writers of An Alarm. To the freemen and electors of Pennsylvania were
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more specific. They accused Republicans of attempting to place “the principal part of the
power of the state” in the Supreme Executive Council. They painted Republicans’
accusations of wrongdoing by the Assembly as a series of unfair slights against “the
dignity of the Legislature,” which occupied a special place in the state government,
“compos[ing] a just and equal representation of the people.”
The pamphlet also questioned Republicans’ commitment to the war effort,
challenging the assertions made by the constitution’s opponents that they had been ardent
and longsuffering in their devotion to the conflict. It presented Republicans as ineffectual
in their support for the military conflict and suggested that some might be concealing past
support for Britain:
With all their boasted pretensions to early and decided whiggism, most of them
were skulkers under petty offices, or pretended indisposition. Their patriotism has
seldom extended beyond bawling in a Coffee-House or Tavern, or insulting the
persons or seizing the property of the tories. Many of them were downright tories
themselves in the beginning of the war, and now affect a mighty zeal for your
liberties, only to throw a cover on their former baseness.142
Republicans emerged from this scathing characterization as, at best, insubstantial
in their contributions to the War for Independence, or, at worst, as Loyalists who
were currently feigning support for the Patriot effort. Both A Candid Examination
and An Alarm indicated the extent to which partisans in the constitutional debate
attempted to solidify their status as active contributors to the war effort and
dismiss their opponents as obstacles to American victory. They also suggested
that the constitution’s supporters and opponents equated the Revolution as a
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political process with the War for Independence and therefore sought to
demonstrate the validity of their respective stances on the constitution by pointing
to their own experience in fighting the war and thus making the Revolution’s
fulfillment possible.
III.

Contesting the Constitution in the Second Session

Debates over the state constitution were not conclusively settled when the Council of
Censors adjourned early in 1784, the Republican majority having failed to produce the
amending convention they initially hoped for. The body reconvened late in the summer of
that year and picked up where the first session left off. Both sides continued to grapple, as
heatedly as before and still to little apparent avail, over the viability of the constitution.
Republicans’ prospects of amending the constitution appeared even dimmer than they had
previously--a Republican member of the Council resigned and was replaced by
prominent Constitutionalist George Bryan, three other Constitutionalists were added to
the Council, and a Republican member decided not to attend the second session. These
developments gave the Constitutionalists a clear majority in the Council and effectively
foreclosed the possibility of an amending convention being called.143 The deliberations of
the Censors’ second session were unfruitful, yet they warrant attention because of the
insights they provide into the attitudes towards altering the constitution voiced by both
sides of the debate.
In the second session, the constitution’s defenders again asserted that popular
sovereignty was the basis for the document. They explicitly recognized its concessions to
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popular control of government. They posited that it reposed “all civil power on the
authority of the people only, in whom the sovereignty resides.” The government
enshrined “the natural rights of individuals” as the source of political authority. They
argued, contrary to the assertions of their Republican adversaries, that the constitution
had successfully divided power among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.
They found the constitution “clear in its principles, accurate in its form, consistent in its
several parts, and worthy of the veneration of the good people of Pennsylvania.”144
One of the best features of the constitution, in their appraisal, was its preclusion of
the “accumulation of influence, in the hands of one or few.” The Constitutionalists
described such a development as “subversive of all public justice and private right” and
favorable to the “capricious, unsteady domination of prejudice, party and self-interest,”
not government by “laws prescribed, promulgated, and known.” They believed that the
emergence of elite political factions was incompatible with the rule of law. In their eyes,
the “capricious” and “unsteady” nature of aristocratic rule precluded the kind of steady
and deliberative government administered under a legally attuned regime.145
As if performing a suite of familiar compositions, the Constitutionalists were playing
on a number of well-known themes without exploring any of them in great depth or
detail. In the same passage, the Constitutionalists appealed to popular sovereignty and the
enshrinement of individual rights while concurrently expressing hostility towards elite
factionalism and arbitrary government. For the constitution’s supporters, popular control
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of government, individual rights, and the rule of law were mutually reinforcing and
inextricably interwoven.146 Unchecked popular sovereignty, as represented in the existing
legislature, was in their estimation the foundation for the enjoyment of individual rights
and protection against the domination of aristocratic interests determined to impose their
arbitrary will upon the Commonwealth.
Revisionists countered by charging that the legislature had operated in a manner that
was excessively energetic and insufficiently deliberative. They invoked John Locke-perhaps an interesting choice, given the abundance of sources on the rule of law from
which they could have chosen--in submitting that the law necessitated stability and
should not be the result of arbitrary actions on the part of the legislature.147 They
contended that the legislature’s conduct had been subversive of the rule of law--it was as
unpredictable as the “aristocratic” mode of government assailed by the convention’s
Constitutionalist contingent. This pointed to what they regarded as a fatal defect with the
constitution: its failure to constrain the legislature to an established sphere of authority
and pattern of behavior.
After a series of debates over various actions taken by the legislature since the
Constitution’s adoption, the clashing parties resumed debate over the nature and bounds
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of popular sovereignty. Rejecting the reformers’ argument that the power to appoint
officers to positions not enumerated by the constitution by default resided with the
Supreme Executive Council, the Constitutionalists appealed to the legislature’s role as the
representative of the popular will.148 The legislature was the “proper depository of all
power not expressly placed elsewhere; for there, every man in the community is equally
represented.” In contrast, the Executive Council was not subject to popular oversight and
could operate in ways contradictory of the wishes of the people. Worse yet, the people
were left with little recourse against such violations of the popular will. The legislature’s
proximity to and accountability to the people made it a better vehicle for realizing the
interests of the people. Constitutionalists’ exposition of the virtues of legislative primacy
was telling. They believed that any obstructions to the people’s ability to dictate
governmental policy were invitations to arbitrary rule.149
The preservationist faction believed that reformers were intent to establish the
Executive Council as the principal lawmaking body and effectively strip the legislature of
its power. They pointed to a 1779 proposal that the executive be given the authority “to
prepare such business as to them shall seem necessary to lay before the general
assembly” as evidence of an effort to grant the council the ability to dictate the terms
upon which pieces of legislature were introduced. They greatly exaggerated the scope of
this proposal; it did not openly curtail the legislature’s power to introduce legislation.
They equated motive with substance and assumed that their opponents’ proposals had
been animated by a desire to establish the Executive Council as the chief lawmaking
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body. The preservationists claimed that the measure would quickly result in the Council
claiming sole authority over the process of introducing laws and control over debate.
They argued that affairs would shortly operate under the premise “that no law should pass
that had not originated with the council.” In their depiction, the proposal was part of an
effort to produce an executive wielding “the appointment to all offices; the originating all
laws; and a negative before debate.”150
Despite these charges, the revisionist element remained adamant about the
importance of preserving executive power against perceived encroachments by the
legislature. They again emphasized the importance of allowing the executive to draw
funds from the treasury, a claim Constitutionalists rejected by asserting the legislature’s
exclusive power over drawing money from the treasury.151 Reiterating the importance of
judicial independence, they argued that the Executive Council’s ability to draw funds
from the treasury was essential to the fixing of state supreme court justices’ salaries.
They portrayed this measure as necessary to insulate justices from constant pressure to
accord with popular sentiment in their rulings.152
Constitutionalists countered the allegations made against them by their opponents,
issuing the strongest accusations yet fielded by either party in the debates of the Council
of Censors. They railed against that the revisionists’ interpretation of the constitution in
favor of executive prerogative, arguing that it evidenced a plot to construct “the most
complete system of aristocratic tyranny, that has ever appeared in the world.” Here were
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explicit charges that their adversaries were conspiring to swiftly and fundamentally
transform the state government from a popular model to an aristocratic one. They noted
that such changes in government had historically occurred “by slow and almost insensible
changes.” However, Republicans had forgone the usual method of instituting aristocracy
through a series of gradual steps. Rather than subtly and slowly working towards the
establishment of an aristocratic regime, they had resolved to implement it “by one stroke
of a pen, and to persuade the people that they ought always to have been so governed.”
Despite their admonitions against this effort to suddenly foist an aristocracy upon the
Commonwealth, the Constitutionalists expressed faith in the resoluteness of the people.
The citizens of Pennsylvania were in their estimation “too enlightened...too high spirited,
and too fond of liberty” to submit to becoming the “mere registers of their haughty and
imperious masters.”153
Yet again, Constitutionalists appealed to what they regarded as the principles of the
American Revolution: enlightenment, the high-spiritedness of the people, and liberty.
Their identification of the reformers’ construction of the state constitution as evidence of
an aristocratic conspiracy, as well as the seemingly hyperbolic epithets they attached to
their opponents, are indicative of the Constitutionalists’ preoccupation with the spirit of
the Revolution and their indebtedness to the Country outlook on politics.
The debates that took place both in the meetings of the Council of Censors in 1783
and 1784, and in members’ published efforts to secure the backing of popular sentiment
revolved around questions of popular sovereignty and the proper distribution of powers
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between the branches of government. They also implicated competing visions of the
American Revolution and its meaning that were connected indissolubly to the Censors’
fundamental disagreements on those questions. While Republicans and Constitutionalists
alike recognized and affirmed popular sovereignty, they altogether disagreed on its
implications.
Republicans believed that in order to secure the Revolution, a clearly delineated
balance of powers between the three branches of government needed to be achieved. This
contention was largely motivated by their belief that constraints on legislative power
needed to be established. Republicans cited a litany of misdeeds committed by the state
legislature since the constitution’s adoption. While these abuses of power undoubtedly
informed the Republican outlook on the nature and proper scope of legislative power,
they were not the source of the preservationists’ conception of a rightful constitutional
legislature. Underpinning their allegations against the transgressions of the state
legislature was a conviction that it simply possessed too much power. Republicans were
philosophically opposed to the preeminence of the legislature and believed that until
written constraints on its power were established, it would continue to misbehave. They
thought that an excess of legislative power threatened to jeopardize the Revolution.
Despite arguing that the people had sustained Pennsylvania through the War for
Independence and acknowledging the sovereignty of the people, they still submitted that
restraints on the direct expression of the people’s will needed to be established.154
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Constitutionalists could scarcely have been any farther away from Republicans on
these issues. They associated the constitution and its concessions to direct popular rule
with the spirit of the Revolution. They thought that unrestrained control of the
government by the people was interchangeable with the cause of the American
Revolution. Therefore, they argued, proposals for establishing constraints on the political
agency of the people were, by extension, overtures towards an abandonment of the
Revolution. This explains their seemingly irrational contention that Republicans were
scarcely more congenial towards the cause of the Revolution than the British Empire was.
These arguments were informed by the rhetoric and outlook of the Whig tradition. But
they were not simply its product. Rather, they evidenced a fervor for popular sovereignty
that cannot be ascribed solely to the influence of the “paranoid style” in Anglo-American
politics.155 It was a mania shaped indelibly by the Constitutionalists’ understanding that
their conception of popular sovereignty, which was reflected in the state constitution, was
inseparable from the cause of the American Revolution. For them, the Revolution was a
project in realizing the possibilities of direct legislative representation.
The Council of Censors’ deliberations did not ultimately produce any changes in the
structure of the Pennsylvania government. The constitution remained intact, the
revisionists flustered in their efforts to amend it and the preservationists satisfied that
they had blocked an effort to sacrifice popular government on the altars of aristocratic
domination and executive prerogative. However, the issues over which the two parties

155

See Bailyn, Ideological Origins; Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, and
Other Essays (New York: Vintage, 1964); Gordon S. Wood, “Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style: Causality
and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century,” William and Mary Quarterly 39, no. 3 (July, 1982), 401-441.

82

within the Council of Censors clashed continued to inspire debate and define the contours
of state politics.156 The constitution of 1776 remained a point of intense contention,
inspiring unflagging support from its partisans and inexorable criticism from its
detractors. Perhaps most importantly, the debate over the constitution revealed both
parties’ conscious identification with the spirit and cause of the Revolution.
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Conclusion
The Pennsylvania constitution remained intact until 1790, when its critics finally
succeeded in replacing it with a constitution that accorded more closely with traditional
notions about government. In the interim, it remained a consistent object of debate. The
constitutional debate extended well beyond the conclusion of hostilities with Britain and
overlapped with the state’s debates over ratifying the Federal Constitution in 1787.
Constitutional discord was a persistent source of tension throughout the 1780s.
The length and intensity of the constitutional debate prompt several questions.
Why would a constitution adopted by partisans of the Patriot movement provoke such
controversy among the state’s proponents of independence? How could such an
embattled document withstand constant assaults and outlive the United States’ first
founding document, the Articles of Confederation? In light of the extensive disagreement
over the document’s suitability for guiding the state through the War for Independence,
why would the debate rage on after independence had been gained and the war
concluded?
The only satisfactory answer to these questions is that disagreement on the
constitution arose from such fundamental division over central questions of governmental
order that compromise was unthinkable. Constitutionalists and Republicans believed they
were vying for the direction of the Revolution in their battle over the constitution
Constitutionalists argued that a governmental structure that closely adhered to the
notion of popular sovereignty was crucial to maintaining liberty. They contended that
direct representation of the popular will, coupled with an abandonment of traditional
84

mechanisms for dividing power, were the best means of achieving this. Republicans
countered that such an arrangement flew in the face of prevailing arguments about the
importance of balancing power and the dangers of conferring an excess of direct control
to the people.
At its core, the debate between the constitution’s supporters and critics was an
internal contest to determine the nature and course of politics in Pennsylvania. They were
not concerned merely with achieving home rule, and the central issue at stake was not
determining which societal interest should govern. Both parties agreed that independence
was essential. And while socioeconomic considerations were sometimes voiced, they did
not predominate, and Constitutionalists and Republicans were not clearly divided along
social or economic lines. A Whiggish interpretation stressing the unanimity and concord
of Patriots does not provide a satisfactory understanding of Pennsylvania’s politics during
the Revolutionary period. Neither does the Progressive approach, with its emphasis on
the disorder wrought by a multiplicity of adversarial interests.
The Pennsylvania political debate can best be explained as an internal contest
animated primarily by conflicting visions of government. While these visions cannot be
neatly attributed to clearly identifiable sources of inspiration, they were apparent from the
constitution’s adoption. This indicates that the ideologies were latent, embedded
somewhere within the state’s political consciousness. The coinciding of hostilities with
Britain and the adoption of the constitution provided the impetus for these distinct visions
of governmental order to be expressed. The constitution’s authors envisioned a political
community bound together by a common commitment to the principles of popular
85

government. Instead, they created a governing document which inspired extensive
conflict, demonstrating the centrality of constitutional principles to political debate and
the ways in which Patriots of various stripes understood the American Revolution.
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